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I   INTRODUCTION 
The Australian Royal Commission into Institutional Responses to Child 
Sexual Abuse (‘Royal Commission’) was established in early 2013 and the extent 
of historical and continuing child sexual abuse in institutional contexts in 
Australia is coming to light through its work. The Royal Commission has 
emphasised the difficulties which many survivors of such sexual abuse 
(‘survivors’) have had in obtaining redress or tortious compensation for their 
abuse. The Royal Commission has recently delivered a report on redress and civil 
litigation which is final in relation to these issues: Redress and Civil Litigation 
Report.1 The Commissioners concluded that: 
We are satisfied that our society’s failure to protect children across a number of 
generations makes clear the pressing need to provide avenues through which 
survivors can obtain appropriate redress for past abuse. It also highlights the 
importance of improving the capacity of the civil litigation systems to provide 
justice to survivors in a manner at least comparable to that of other injured persons 
so that those who suffer abuse in the future are not forced to go through the 
experiences of those who have sought redress to date.2 
To address this need to provide avenues of redress and improve the capacity 
of civil litigation to provide justice to survivors, the Royal Commission has 
recommended the implementation of a national redress scheme which would 
include monetary payments to survivors of past institutional child sexual abuse 
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1 Commonwealth, Royal Commission into Institutional Responses to Child Sexual Abuse, Redress and 
Civil Litigation Report (2015) (‘Redress and Civil Litigation Report’). 
2 Ibid 5. 
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(‘past abuse survivors’),3 and other statutory reforms. For example, the scheme 
would introduce new statutory liabilities for institutions which would provide 
avenues for civil compensation for future survivors of institutional child sexual 
abuse (‘future abuse survivors’), but not for past abuse survivors.4 
Whatever reform results, tort law will clearly continue to play an important 
role in providing access to civil compensation for both past and future survivors. 
Either it will be the only option available (for future survivors to whom the 
redress scheme will not apply, or for all survivors if a redress scheme is not 
implemented) 5  or it may be a preferred course for some survivors. Civil 
proceedings in tort can lead to remedies in damages which are real and 
substantial, and can have a very significant vindicating effect for a plaintiff,6 
affirming the survivor’s story and punishing perpetrators and responsible 
institutions. There is also the prospect of awards of compensation in amounts 
potentially far greater than those which may be available under a redress scheme. 
There are also identified drawbacks of tort law as a means of compensation. 
Chief among these are the costs and delays of the litigation process, the difficulty 
of assessing damages for future needs, and the uncertainties inherent in the court 
                                                 
3 The proposed redress scheme is intended to be a national scheme funded by relevant institutions with 
state and federal government funding as a last resort. It is estimated that it would cost approximately $4.3 
billion, modelled on meeting claims by up to 60 000 existing survivors: ibid 33. The Turnbull 
Government has announced that it will ‘lead the development of a national approach to redress’ and that 
it will ‘soon’ commence discussions with the states and territories: George Brandis and Christian Porter, 
‘Developing a National Approach to Redress for Survivors of Institutional Child Sexual Abuse’ (Joint 
Media Release, 29 January 2016).  
4 Redress and Civil Litigation Report, above n 1, 6.  
5 It is instructive that nearly 20 years after the report by the Human Rights and Equal Opportunity 
Commission unequivocally recommended redress for members of the Stolen Generations, there is still no 
joint national compensation fund for members of the Stolen Generations: Human Rights and Equal 
Opportunity Commission, Bringing Them Home: Report of the National Inquiry into the Separation of 
Aboriginal and Torres Strait Islander Children from Their Families (1997) recs 14–16 (‘Bringing Them 
Home Report’). Only Tasmania has legislated for compensation of the Stolen Generations: Stolen 
Generations of Aboriginal Children Act 2006 (Tas). In SA the Stolen Generations (Compensation) Bill 
2014 (SA) is under consideration. In NSW there is a current Legislative Council Inquiry into Reparations 
for the Stolen Generations. Submissions closed on 31 March 2016 and the Committee is expected to table 
a report in mid-2016: Parliament of New South Wales, Reparations for the Stolen Generations in New 
South Wales <https://www.parliament.nsw.gov.au/committees/inquiries/Pages/inquiry-
details.aspx?pk=1645>. Four separate non-government Bills were introduced in the Commonwealth 
Senate between 2007 and 2010 but none has progressed: Stolen Generation Compensation Bill 2007 
(Cth); Stolen Generation Compensation Bill 2008 (Cth); Stolen Generations Reparations Tribunal Bill 
2008 (Cth); Stolen Generations Reparations Tribunal Bill 2010 (Cth).  
6 For a discussion of the vindicating role of tortious damages, see generally Normann Witzleb and Robyn 
Carroll, ‘The Role of Vindication in Torts Damages’ (2009) 17 Tort Law Review 16; Bruce Feldthusen, 
Olena Hankivsky and Lorraine Greaves, ‘Therapeutic Consequences of Civil Actions for Damages and 
Compensation Claims by Victims of Sexual Abuse’ (2000) 12 Canadian Journal of Women and the Law 
66; Bruce Feldthusen, ‘The Civil Action for Sexual Battery: Therapeutic Jurisprudence?’ (1993) 25 
Ottawa Law Review 203; Robyn Carroll and Normann Witzleb, ‘“It’s Not Just about the Money” – 
Enhancing the Vindicatory Effect of Private Law Remedies’ (2011) 37 Monash University Law Review 
216. 
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process with the possibility of adverse costs orders. 7  Additionally, in cases 
concerning severe personal trauma, the difficulties faced by plaintiffs in  
cross-examination and the possibility of re-traumatisation cannot be ignored.8 
However, for some survivors it is unlikely that there will be a choice as to the 
avenue for compensation, and civil litigation may be their only option. 
This article examines existing avenues for survivors to seek tortious 
compensation from institutions and options for reform. Under current  
Australian law, there are numerous procedural and doctrinal obstacles to such 
compensation over and above the ordinary risks and burdens of litigation.9 The 
recommendations of the Royal Commission with respect to civil litigation are 
designed to provide clearer avenues to compensation for survivors than exist at 
common law. This is a much needed area of reform given the current state of the 
common law. We consider the nature and scope of the Royal Commission’s 
proposed reforms to institutional liability and additional options for reform. 
We take the need for improved access to redress and justice through civil 
litigation identified by the Royal Commission as the starting point for this 
analysis. Options for reform arise in the context of a range of interconnected 
issues: the Royal Commission has made recommendations with respect to new 
statutory liabilities, nomination of proper defendants, and the removal of 
limitation periods among other things. It is not possible to consider any one issue 
in isolation from the others, so this article also addresses a range of relevant 
matters to locate the main issues with respect to tortious compensation from 
institutions in this broader context. 
We note that some survivors are also members of the Stolen Generations  
and to that extent this article addresses some of the issues identified in the 
Bringing Them Home Report as making civil process daunting or impossible for 
Stolen Generations members,10 who face similar legal and procedural obstacles  
to compensation for abuse suffered. 11  But there are also very different and 
significant legal impediments facing Stolen Generations members in establishing 
tortious causes of action for historical removal of children that was, at the time, 
                                                 
7 Richard L Abel, ‘A Critique of Torts’ (1990) 37 UCLA Law Review 785; John Smillie, ‘The Future of 
Negligence’ (2007) 15 Torts Law Journal 300; Terence G Ison, The Forensic Lottery: A Critique of Tort 
Liability as a System of Personal Injury Compensation (Staples Press, 1967); Peter Cane, Atiyah’s 
Accidents, Compensation and the Law (Cambridge University Press, 7th ed, 2006); Productivity 
Commission, Disability Care and Support: Inquiry Report, Report No 54 (2011) vol 1, ch 17. 
8 Feldthusen, Hankivsky and Greaves, above n 6; Feldthusen, above n 6. 
9 The perpetrator may be deceased, imprisoned or bankrupt so prospects of recovering compensation can 
be very low. Therefore, avenues for compensation from the institution in which the abuse occurred 
become an important alternative. 
10 Bringing Them Home Report, above n 5, ch 14.  
11 The most serious of those obstacles are: the effects of limitation statutes (Cubillo v Commonwealth [No 
2] (2000) 103 FCR 1 (‘Cubillo’); Williams v Minister, Aboriginal Land Rights Act 1983 (1994) 35 
NSWLR 497 (‘Williams’)); evidentiary problems (Cubillo (2000) 103 FCR 1; Williams (1994) 35 
NSWLR 497) though the plaintiff overcame many of these obstacles and was successful in State of South 
Australia v Lampard-Trevorrow (2010) 106 SASR 331); and establishing vicarious liability (Cubillo 
(2000) 103 FCR 1). 
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legally authorised.12  The Royal Commission did not consider that its Letters 
Patent enabled it to consider redress for Stolen Generations members other than 
in respect of institutional child sexual abuse.13 Accordingly, the discussion which 
follows is limited to remedies for institutional child sexual abuse, though some 
issues are equally relevant to claims by Stolen Generations members in respect of 
other forms of historical mistreatment or abuse. 
This article is in four parts. Part II examines the current limitations to 
establishing institutional liability for historical abuse at common law in Australia, 
and compares the Royal Commission’s proposed statutory liabilities with 
developments at common law in other jurisdictions which have addressed the 
same issues. The desirability of statutory reform to the common law in the 
Australian context is examined and the importance of a uniform package of 
reforms is also discussed. Part III of the article explores the applicability of 
aspects of civil liability legislation14 in Australian jurisdictions to child sexual 
abuse cases and the case for including in any reform package provisions which 
exclude their operation to such cases. Part IV focuses upon the difficulties which 
survivors face in identifying proper defendants in cases where abuse occurred in 
faith-based institutions where there is no corporate entity that holds property that 
would be available to satisfy a judgment. It considers the Royal Commission’s 
recommendation to deal with this issue15 and other possible approaches to reform. 
Part V briefly considers the effect of statutory limitation periods on civil 
proceedings in relation to historical child sexual abuse, the Royal Commission’s 
recommendations and legislative developments to date.16 
 
II   BASIS OF INSTITUTIONAL LIABILITY IN THE ABSENCE 
OF FAULT BY THE INSTITUTION 
At common law in Australia, the basis upon which an institution can be made 
liable in tort to compensate survivors is currently unclear in the absence of fault 
on the part of the institution. An understanding of the current state of the 
common law, and the developments which have occurred at common law in 
other jurisdictions such as Canada and England, is necessary to fully appreciate 
                                                 
12 Kruger v Commonwealth (1997) 190 CLR 1; Cubillo v Commonwealth (2001) 112 FCR 455; Williams v 
Minister, Aboriginal Land Rights Act 1983 (1999) 25 Fam LR 86. See generally Tony Buti, ‘Removal of 
Indigenous Children from their Families: The Litigation Path’ (1998) 27 University of Western Australia 
Law Review 203; Antonio Buti, ‘The Stolen Generations and Litigation Revisited’ (2008) 32 Melbourne 
University Law Review 382; Randall Kune, ‘The Stolen Generations in Court: Explaining the Lack of 
Widespread Successful Litigation by Members of the Stolen Generations’ (2011) 30 University of 
Tasmania Law Review 32. 
13 Redress and Civil Litigation Report, above n 1, 5. 
14 Civil Law (Wrongs) Act 2002 (ACT); Civil Liability Act 2002 (NSW); Personal Injuries (Liabilities and 
Damages) Act 2003 (NT); Civil Liability Act 2003 (Qld); Civil Liability Act 1936 (SA); Civil Liability Act 
2002 (Tas); Wrongs Act 1958 (Vic); Civil Liability Act 2002 (WA). 
15 Redress and Civil Litigation Report, above n 1, 511, recs 94–5.  
16 Ibid 459, recs 85–8.  
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the intent and scope of the Royal Commission’s proposed reforms, and 
alternative options for reform. Accordingly, this Part examines the common law 
in Australia and other jurisdictions, and against that background, analyses the 
proposed reforms to institutional liability. 
There are two common law doctrines that survivors could potentially use to 
bring such an action: vicarious liability or a non-delegable duty to ensure 
reasonable care is taken. These are examined below. 
 
A   Vicarious Liability under Australian Law 
Vicarious liability in tort imposes strict liability upon a defendant for the 
negligence or intentional wrongdoing of another in the absence of fault by the 
defendant. Under current law in Australia, there are two important inquiries in 
the application of vicarious liability, both of which can give rise to difficulties for 
survivors. One is establishing a relevant relationship between the abuser and 
defendant, most commonly an employment relationship. Here there is a further 
inquiry, which is whether the impugned act was done ‘in the course of 
employment’. This inquiry is used to establish the sufficiency of the connection 
between the tortious conduct and the employment to justify imposing vicarious 
liability. 
 
1 The ‘Course of Employment’ Test 
The ‘course of employment’ test17 provides that in addition to liability for 
authorised acts, an employer may also be liable for wrongful and unauthorised 
acts if they are so connected with authorised acts that they may be regarded as 
modes, although improper modes, of doing them. However, according to this test, 
the employer is not responsible if the unauthorised and wrongful act is not so 
connected with the authorised act as to be a mode of doing it, but is an 
independent act.18 
Determining when intentional wrongdoing19 amounts to an improper mode of 
doing an authorised act is notoriously difficult. Nonetheless, the ‘course of 
employment’ test remains an essential inquiry under Australian law. In Deatons20 
it was interpreted so that intentional wrongdoing can only give rise to vicarious 
liability if it was ‘incidental’21 to the employment, in the sense of being done in 
‘furtherance of the master’s interests’, or in ostensible pursuit of the employer’s 
business, or in apparent execution of authority which the employer holds the 
                                                 
17 Also referred to as the ‘Salmond’ test, referring to its articulation in Salmond on Torts in 1907. This was 
also the standard test in Canada: see Canadian Pacific Railway Co v Lockhardt [1942] AC 591 (before it 
was expanded in Bazley v Curry [1999] 2 SCR 534 (‘Bazley’)), and in England: see ST v North Yorkshire 
County Council [1999] LGR 584 (‘Trotman’) (Trotman was overruled by the House of Lords in Lister v 
Hesley Hall Ltd [2002] 1 AC 215 where the scope of the ‘course of employment’ test was reconsidered). 
18 R F V Heuston and R A Buckley, Salmond and Heuston on the Law of Torts (Sweet & Maxwell, 21st ed, 
1996) 443; Deatons Pty Ltd v Flew (1949) 79 CLR 370 (‘Deatons’). 
19 Such as theft, fraud, and physical assault. 
20 (1949) 79 CLR 370. 
21 Ibid 378 (Latham CJ). 
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employee out as having.22 The difficulty in characterising deliberate, criminal 
sexual abuse of a child by an employee of an institution in this way is  
obvious. Vicarious liability for child sexual abuse was considered by the High 
Court in New South Wales v Lepore (‘Lepore’),23 discussed in more detail below. 
However, the reasons of the Court in relation to vicarious liability were varied 
with no clear ratio. Deatons was not overruled, despite some suggestion that 
vicarious liability could arise in respect of child sexual abuse in an institutional 
context. This has left survivors facing considerable uncertainty as to whether a 
claim relying on vicarious liability will be successful or not under Australian law. 
 
2 Vicarious Liability Only in Respect of ‘Employees’ 
Another significant limitation of vicarious liability at common law is that 
traditionally, it is limited to employees and does not extend to wrongdoing of 
independent contractors. 24  This is a deeply entrenched limit on the scope of 
vicarious liability. 25  However, there are also longstanding criticisms of it. 26 
Professor Atiyah once noted that changing work practices might require this 
dichotomy between employees and contractors to be revisited. 27  The more 
employers contract out work to avoid tax and employment consequences, or 
vicarious liability, the greater the impact on potential compensation through 
vicarious liability. Further, poorly resourced or underinsured contractors (who 
may be cheaper to engage) may be unable to meet any liability to a plaintiff 
harmed by their work done at the request of the employer. In Northern 
Sandblasting Pty Ltd v Harris,28 and in Hollis v Vabu Pty Ltd,29 McHugh J agreed 
with Professor Atiyah’s arguments and favoured development of the law. To date 
this has been a minority view in the High Court. These issues are however 
increasingly relevant to this debate, as in the sectors involved in working with 
children, significant responsibilities are frequently contracted out. 
Other working relationships can be difficult to pigeonhole as relationships of 
employment. Foster care is a well-known example that is usually not an 
employment relationship with the institution with responsibility for the child, so 
falls outside the scope of vicarious liability. There are particular issues within the 
context of religious organisations30 where the relationship of a priest or religious 
                                                 
22 Ibid 381 (Dixon J); approved and applied in New South Wales v Lepore (2003) 212 CLR 511, 537 [46] 
(Gleeson CJ), 591–2 [231] (Gummow and Hayne JJ) (‘Lepore’). See also Zorom Enterprises Pty Ltd v 
Zabow (2007) 71 NSWLR 354, 360 [21] (Basten JA).  
23 (2003) 212 CLR 511. 
24 Hollis v Vabu Pty Ltd (2001) 207 CLR 21, 44–5 [57] (Gleeson CJ, Gaudron, Gummow, Kirby and Hayne 
JJ). 
25 Day v The Ocean Beach Hotel Shellharbour Pty Ltd (2013) 85 NSWLR 335, 341 [14] (Leeming JA).  
26 See, eg, P S Atiyah, Vicarious Liability in the Law of Torts (Butterworths, 1967) 333. 
27 Ibid. 
28 (1997) 188 CLR 313, 366–7.  
29 (2001) 207 CLR 21, 53–4. Justice McHugh also referred to Justice Colin Phegan, ‘Employers’ Liability 
for Independent Contractors in Tort Law’ (2000) 4 Judicial Review 395, who said that this case brings 
into sharp relief the ‘ramifications for vicarious liability law of the progressive vertical disintegration of 
employment’: at 420.  
30 See especially Trustees of the Roman Catholic Church v Ellis (2007) 70 NSWLR 565 (‘Ellis’). 
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official to the parish or diocese or other church entity often falls outside the 
traditional employment paradigm. In a number of recent English and Canadian 
decisions dealing with the liability of the church for sexual abuse by priests, 
courts have found relationships ‘akin to’ employment which sufficed for the 
purposes of establishing the vicarious liability of the church or diocesan body.31 
These developments acknowledge that strict adherence to the form of traditional 
employment relationships would be unduly limiting of the public policy 
justifications for vicarious liability. These issues are equally apposite to claims 
brought by survivors against the clergy in Australia. 
 
3 Developments in Vicarious Liability in Other Jurisdictions 
In Canada and in England the traditional ‘course of employment’ test has 
been relaxed so that focus is now placed upon different criteria to demonstrate a 
sufficient connection between the wrongdoing and the employer. The result is 
that institutional liability for child sexual abuse can be established in a manner 
which is not available under Australian law. 
In Canada, in Bazley,32 the Supreme Court of Canada found that a residential 
facility, The Children’s Foundation, was vicariously liable for sexual abuse of 
children by an employed childcare worker. Justice McLachlin (for the Court) 
held that courts should ‘openly confront the question of whether liability should 
lie against the employer, rather than obscuring the decision beneath semantic 
discussions of “scope of employment” and “mode of conduct”’.33 Instead, the 
Court focused on identifying whether the wrong was ‘closely and materially 
related to a risk introduced or enhanced by the employer’.34 Without this, it was 
held that vicarious liability ‘serves no deterrent purpose, and relegates the 
employer to the status of an involuntary insurer’.35 It was held that public policy 
requires a ‘strong connection between what the employer was asking the 
employee to do … and the wrongful act’, so that it can be said that ‘the 
employer significantly increased the risk of the harm by putting the employee in 
his or her position and requiring him to perform the assigned tasks’.36 
                                                 
31 See, eg, Various Claimants v Catholic Child Welfare Society [2013] 2 AC 1, 17 [47] (Lord Phillips) 
(‘Catholic Child Welfare’), approved and discussed in Cox v Ministry of Justice [2016] 2 WLR 806, 814 
[24] (Lord Reed SCJ) (Lord Neuberger P, Baroness Hale DP, Lord Dyson MR and Lord Toulson SCJ 
agreeing). In Canada see, eg, John Doe v Bennett [2004] 1 SCR 436, 449 [27] (McLachlin CJ). 
32 [1999] 2 SCR 534. 
33 Ibid 559 [41]. 
34 Ibid 556 [36]. 
35 Ibid. 
36 Ibid 560 [42] (emphasis in original). While this might appear to be attributing blame to the institution, the 
Court did not find wrongdoing by the institution or require it to found the claim based on vicarious 
liability. Instead, references to the fact that the employer ‘increased the risk of harm’ go to determining 
the threshold or circumstances in which it is just and fair to impose liability on the institution for the 
tortious wrongdoing of its employee in the absence of personal fault for the particular tort in question. 
However, the creation of risk can also lead to direct liability: see EB v Order of the Oblates of Mary 
Immaculate of the Province of British Columbia [2005] 3 SCR 45, 64 [27] (Binnie J). 
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A new test was proposed. Firstly, the court should consider if any precedent 
concerning very similar facts exists to resolve the question.37 If not, the next step 
is to determine whether vicarious liability should be imposed in light of the 
broader public policy rationales which underpin vicarious liability.38 The Court 
posed a number of factors to assist in determining whether an employer had 
created a material increase in the risk of harm occurring. These included: (a) the 
opportunity that the enterprise afforded the employee to abuse his or her power; 
(b) the extent to which the wrongful act may have furthered the employer’s aims; 
(c) the extent to which the wrongful act was related to friction, confrontation or 
intimacy inherent in the employer’s enterprise; (d) the extent of power conferred 
on the employee in relation to the victim; and (e) the vulnerability of potential 
victims to wrongful exercise of the employee’s power.39 
Similar development of vicarious liability has also taken place in England. In 
Lister v Hesley Hall Ltd the House of Lords held that an institution might be held 
vicariously liable for child sexual abuse by an employee if there was a ‘close 
connection’ between the abuse and the employment. However, the reasons for 
judgment in that case varied considerably 40  and were criticised for lacking 
sufficient guidance as to when liability should arise. 41  The Supreme Court 
clarified the test in Catholic Child Welfare 42  and again more recently in 
Mohamud v WM Morrison Supermarkets plc.43 In Catholic Child Welfare, Lord 
Phillips held that vicarious liability is imposed where the defendant has used the 
abuser to further its own interests and put the abuser in a position which has 
‘created or significantly enhanced the risk that the victim or victims would suffer 
the relevant abuse’. 44  In Mohamud, the Supreme Court approved Lister and 
Catholic Child Welfare and held that ‘[t]he cases in which the necessary 
connection has been found … are cases in which the employee used or misused 
                                                 
37 Bazley [1999] 2 SCR 534, 545 [15]. 
38 Ibid.  
39 Ibid 560 [3]. These principles in relation to vicarious liability have been approved by Canadian courts in 
numerous cases subsequently: see, eg, Jacobi v Griffiths [1999] 2 SCR 570; Blackwater v Plint [2005] 3 
SCR 3. 
40 [2002] 1 AC 215, 227 [20] (Lord Steyn) (‘Lister’) (emphasis added). In so doing it overruled ST v North 
Yorkshire County Council [1999] LGR 584. In this case, Butler-Sloss LJ held that sexual assaults were 
‘far removed from an unauthorised mode of carrying out a teacher’s duties’: at 591. Chadwick LJ also 
found that it was ‘impossible to hold that the commission of acts of indecent assault can be regarded as a 
mode – albeit an improper or unauthorised mode – of doing [what he was employed to do]’: at 592–3. 
41 In Canada, in Jacobi v Griffiths [1999] 2 SCR 570, decided concurrently with Bazley, the Supreme Court 
reached the opposite result to that in Bazley, leading some to question how easily the new test can be 
applied. In Dubai Aluminium Co Ltd v Salaam [2003] 2 AC 366, Lord Nicholls observed that the ‘close 
connection’ test, applied in Lister v Hesley Hall Ltd ‘focuses attention in the right direction. But it affords 
no guidance on the type or degree of connection which will normally be regarded as sufficiently close to 
prompt the legal conclusion that the risk of the wrongful act occurring, and any loss flowing from the 
wrongful act, should fall on the firm of employer rather than the third party who was wronged’: at 377–8 
[25]. See also Paula Giliker, ‘Making the Right Connection: Vicarious Liability and Institutional 
Responsibility’ (2009) 17 Torts Law Journal 35. 
42 [2013] 2 AC 1. 
43 [2016] 2 WLR 821 (‘Mohamud’).  
44 Catholic Child Welfare [2013] 2 AC 1, 26 [86]–[87].  
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the position entrusted to him in a way which injured the third party’.45 This is 
now substantially the same as the law in Canada. 
These developments have replaced the traditional form of the ‘course of 
employment’ test with a broader range of factors than those applied under the 
Deatons test, to determine the sufficiency of the connection between the abuse 
and the institution/employer to justify vicarious liability. 
 
B   Non-delegable Duty of Care 
The non-delegable duty is a personal duty to ensure that reasonable care is 
taken.46 It has been described as a ‘sub-species of negligence law’.47 Recognised 
categories have involved ‘a person being so placed in relation to another as “to 
assume a particular responsibility for [that other person’s] safety” because of the 
latter’s “special dependence or vulnerability”’.48 In certain circumstances (such as 
schools vis-a-vis students,49 employers vis-a-vis employees,50 and hospitals vis-a-
vis patients)51 the law recognises a duty to ensure that reasonable care is taken 
and liability for functions integral to this positive duty cannot be delegated, even 
if the tasks are delegated to an independent contractor.52 Any negligence on the 
part of an independent contractor in fulfilling such a duty will be sheeted home to 
the principal.53 No other common law jurisdiction has applied a non-delegable 
duty to impose liability for institutional child sexual abuse. However, it has been 
considered by the High Court in Australia, and has influenced the Royal 
Commission’s recommendations,54 so it warrants consideration. 
 
C   The High Court: New South Wales v Lepore 
In Lepore55 the High Court considered institutional liability for sexual abuse 
of children by teachers in primary schools. Appeals were brought from the 
Supreme Court of New South Wales (Lepore v New South Wales)56 and the 
Supreme Court of Queensland (Rich v Queensland)57 and were heard together. 
Both vicarious liability and the non-delegable duty of care were considered by 
the High Court. 
                                                 
45 Mohamud [2016] 2 WLR 821, 835 [45] (Lord Toulson SCJ). 
46 Commonwealth v Introvigne (1982) 150 CLR 258, 271 (Mason J); Kondis v State Transport Authority 
(1984) 154 CLR 672, 686–7 (Mason J). See also Northern Sandblasting Pty Ltd v Harris (1997) 188 CLR 
313. 
47 John Murphy, ‘The Liability Bases of Common Law Non-delegable Duties – A Reply to Christian 
Witting’ (2007) 30 University of New South Wales Law Journal 86, 99. 
48 Lepore (2003) 212 CLR 511, 551 [99] (Kirby J). 
49 Commonwealth v Introvigne (1982) 150 CLR 258. 
50 Kondis v State Transport Authority (1984) 154 CLR 672. 
51 Albrighton v Royal Prince Alfred Hospital (1980) 2 NSWLR 542. 
52 Woodland v Swimming Teachers Association [2014] AC 537, 583 [23] (Lord Sumption SCJ). 
53 See, eg, Commonwealth v Introvigne (1982) 150 CLR 258. 
54 Redress and Civil Litigation Report, above n 1, 490.  
55 (2003) 212 CLR 511.  
56 (2001) 52 NSWLR 420. 
57 (2001) Aust Torts Reports ¶81-626. 
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In the proceedings below in Lepore v New South Wales, in the New South 
Wales Court of Appeal, Mason P (with whom Davies AJA agreed) held that the 
scope of the non-delegable duty ‘extends to ensuring that [the children] are not 
injured physically at the hands of an employed teacher (whether acting 
negligently or intentionally)’.58 Justice Heydon dissented.59 His Honour noted that 
the teacher’s alleged conduct was ‘not aptly characterised as a failure to take 
reasonable care’.60 In the Queensland proceedings, Rich v Queensland, the Court 
of Appeal declined to follow the New South Wales Court of Appeal’s decision 
with respect to the scope of the non-delegable duty. 
In the High Court, the majority (McHugh J dissenting) rejected the 
application of the non-delegable duty to child sexual abuse in an institutional 
context. 61  Justices Gummow and Hayne held that the extension of the non-
delegable duty to such intentional acts would ‘remove the duty altogether from 
any connection with the law of negligence’.62 Chief Justice Gleeson (with whom 
Callinan J agreed)63 observed that: 
Intentional wrongdoing, especially intentional criminality, introduces a factor of 
legal relevance beyond a mere failure to take care. Homicide, rape, and theft are 
all acts that are inconsistent with care of person or property, but to characterise 
them as failure to take care, for the purposes of assigning tortious responsibility to 
a third party, would be to evade an issue.64 
Only McHugh J, in dissent, accepted that a non-delegable duty could apply to 
intentional wrongdoing as well as negligent conduct and therefore ought to apply 
to sexual abuse.65 
In relation to the scope of vicarious liability, there was no clear ratio.66 The 
High Court considered the developments which had by then taken place in 
Canada and England, but there was no clear majority support for developing the 
law in a comparable way. Justices Gummow and Hayne in a joint judgment, and 
Callinan J, held that sexual abuse could not be regarded as falling within the 
                                                 
58 Lepore v New South Wales (2001) 52 NSWLR 420, 432 [61]. 
59 Ibid 443 [109]. His Honour noted the submission made that such a duty as proposed would render the 
employer liable if say, a nurse decided to carry out an ad hoc euthanasia in a hospital, or if a teacher 
murdered a student, or if senior counsel’s clerk shot his receptionist. 
60 Ibid 443 [107]. 
61 See Lepore (2003) 212 CLR 511, 535 [38] (Gleeson CJ), 601 [265] (Gummow and Hayne JJ), 624 [339] 
(Callinan J).  
62 Ibid 601 [266]. 
63 Ibid 624 [340]. 
64 Ibid 531–2 [31]. 
65 Ibid 571–2 [161]. 
66 In Catholic Child Welfare [2013] 2 AC 1, 25 [82], Lord Phillips referred to the ‘bewildering variety of 
analysis’ in Lepore. For detailed discussion of the High Court’s judgments see Jane Wangmann, 
‘Liability for Institutional Child Sexual Assault: Where Does Lepore Leave Australia?’ (2004) 28 
Melbourne University Law Review 169; Prue Vines, ‘New South Wales v Lepore; Samin v Queensland; 
Rich v Queensland: Schools’ Responsibility for Teachers’ Sexual Assault: Non-delegable Duty and 
Vicarious Liability’ (2003) 27 Melbourne University Law Review 612. Subsequent case law in relation to 
vicarious liability is difficult to reconcile: Withyman v New South Wales (2013) Aust Torts Reports ¶82-
124; cf A, DC v Prince Alfred College Inc (2015) 67 AILR 350; Erlich v Leifer (2015) Aust Torts Reports 
¶82-245.  
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‘course of employment’ for the purposes of vicarious liability under any 
circumstances, maintaining the traditional scope of the test. 67  Chief Justice 
Gleeson and Gaudron J seemed to accept that it could in certain circumstances, 
but for quite different reasons.68 Justice McHugh did not need to decide the issue 
as his Honour would have applied a non-delegable duty of care. Only Kirby J 
found that the law of vicarious liability should be developed to address such 
claims in a manner comparable to the developments in Canada and England.69 
Chief Justice Gleeson reasoned that: 
where the teacher-student relationship is invested with a high degree of intimacy, 
the use of that power and intimacy to commit sexual abuse may provide a 
sufficient connection between the sexual assault and the employment to make it 
just to treat such contact as occurring in the course of employment.70 
This suggests that abuse by a person holding responsibilities which include 
intimate contact with children could give rise to vicarious liability. However, the 
scope for liability was still limited by the requirement to characterise the abuse as 
occurring within the course of employment.71 For example, Gleeson CJ noted that 
the maintenance of discipline by a teacher is clearly within the employment 
responsibilities of a teacher, so that if the alleged misconduct could be regarded 
as excessive or inappropriate chastisement, this might give rise to vicarious 
liability.72 However, if the conduct of the teacher was found to be ‘so different 
from anything that could be regarded as punishment that it could not properly be 
seen as other than merely sexually predatory behaviour, then, in relation to such 
conduct, the plaintiff would have no case based on vicarious liability’.73 This is 
consistent with Deatons in requiring the abuse to be characterised as occurring 
within the course of employment rather than accepting that the relevant 
connection could be established by the factors applied in Bazley. 
Justice Gaudron reasoned that vicarious liability should only arise in respect 
of deliberate criminal acts where the person against whom liability is asserted is 
estopped from asserting that the person whose acts are in question was not acting 
as his or her servant, agent or representative when the acts occurred.74 However, 
her Honour gave no indication whether such a principle limited liability to acts 
arising in the Deatons sense, or otherwise. 
                                                 
67 Lepore (2003) 212 CLR 511, 594 [239] (Gummow and Hayne JJ), 625 [342] (Callinan J). 
68 Ibid 546 [74] (Gleeson CJ), 561 [130] (Gaudron J). 
69 Ibid 620 [324]. 
70 Ibid 546 [74]. 
71 Ibid.  
72 Ibid 547 [78]. 
73 Ibid. 
74 Ibid 561 [130]. 
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Subsequent case law demonstrates different interpretations of the judgments 
in Lepore and is not easily reconciled.75 Therefore, in Australia, reform to create, 
or clarify, a cause of action for institutional liability for deliberate sexual abuse of 
a child is essential if survivors are to be able to bring proceedings against the 
relevant institution for compensation. 
 
D   The Royal Commission’s Recommendations for New Statutory Duties 
The Royal Commission has recommended the introduction of two new 
statutory liabilities, both of which are to have prospective operation only, to 
provide a cause of action for survivors of child sexual abuse in Australia.76 One is 
a statutory non-delegable duty of care upon certain institutions. The other is a 
statutory liability upon all institutions for child sexual abuse unless the institution 
establishes that it took reasonable care to prevent the abuse. These are examined 
below. 
 
1 A Non-delegable Duty 
In its Report, the Royal Commission recommended that: 
State and territory governments should introduce legislation to impose a non-
delegable duty on certain institutions for institutional child sexual abuse despite it 
being the deliberate criminal act of a person associated with the institution.77 
It is proposed that it should apply to certain institutions only.78 These include 
residential facilities for children, school or day care facilities, disability or health 
services or religious organisations or other facilities operated for profit having 
care, supervision or control of children for a period of time. It is not proposed 
that the duty apply to foster care or kinship care on the basis that the institution 
that arranges these forms of care does not have the degree of supervision or 
control over the home environment to justify the imposition of a non-delegable 
duty.79 Nor is it proposed that the duty would apply to community not-for-profit 
or volunteer institutions offering cultural, social and sporting activities.80 The 
Commission noted that these institutions do not provide particularly high-risk 
services and so excluding these organisations is designed to avoid discouraging 
                                                 
75 See Sprod BNF v Public Relations Oriented Security Pty Ltd (2007) Aust Torts Reports ¶81-921, [54] 
(Ipp JA): ‘It is not easy to trace a certain and secure path through the dicta [in Lepore]’. Since Lepore, 
some courts have rejected claims arising from institutional sexual abuse by distinguishing sexual 
misconduct from anything the employee was authorised or required to do: Withyman v New South Wales 
(2013) Aust Torts Reports ¶82-124 (a sexual relationship between a teacher and an intellectually 
handicapped student in a school); A, DC v Prince Alfred College Inc (2015) Aust Torts Reports ¶82-245 
(abuse by a housemaster of a student in a boarding school) although this was overturned on appeal: 
[2015] SASCFC 161. On the other hand, in Erlich v Leifer (2015) Aust Torts Reports ¶82-245, [125] 
(Rush J) the focus was on misuse of a position of ‘power and intimacy’ by the headmistress of a school, 
which was found to have the relevant connection to give rise to vicarious liability. 
76 Redress and Civil Litigation Report, above n 1, 77, rec 89. See also at 489–91. 
77 Ibid.  
78 Ibid 490.  
79 Ibid 493.  
80 Ibid. 
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valuable cultural, social and sporting association in the community, particularly 
as the risk of liability or the cost of insurance might force such organisations to 
cease providing these services.81 
It appears from the discussion in the Redress and Civil Litigation Report that 
the proposed duty is modelled upon the minority view in Lepore and is intended 
to be a statutory form of the common law non-delegable duty.82 A statutory form 
of institutional liability for child sexual abuse would provide a clear pathway for 
future abuse survivors to establish liability and entitlement to damages. However, 
we make three observations with respect to the form and scope of the proposed 
statutory non-delegable duty: 
 the scope of the proposed duty may be broader than the scope of 
institutional liability imposed in other common law jurisdictions by 
means of vicarious liability;  
 there is an argument in favour of harmonisation with other common law 
jurisdictions that have already addressed these issues by means of 
vicarious liability rather than a non-delegable duty; and 
 there could be potential consequences for the common law from using 
this negligence-based duty, the non-delegable duty of care, as the basis 
for liability for such criminal wrongdoing. 
These issues are considered below. 
 
(a) The Scope of the Proposed Non-delegable Duty 
The proposed statutory non-delegable duty has no comparable provision or 
common law counterpart in other common law jurisdictions. Accordingly, it can 
only be compared with the scope of vicarious liability in other jurisdictions. In 
making that comparison, the proposed statutory non-delegable duty may be 
broader in scope in two respects. 
Firstly, the proposed duty is intended to apply to a greater range of workers 
than historically was within the scope of vicarious liability. The Royal 
Commission has proposed that the institutions subject to the proposed duty may 
be liable for the acts of ‘members or employees’ defined broadly to cover almost 
any working relationship: 
An institution’s ‘members or employees’ should be defined broadly to include 
persons associated with the institution, including officers, office holders, 
employees, agents and volunteers. It should include persons contracted by the 
institution. It should also include priests and religious [sic] associated with the 
institution.83 
As discussed earlier, vicarious liability remains limited to liability for acts of 
employees. The proposed statutory extension of the range of persons for whom 
an institution may be liable effectively bypasses these historical limitations to the 
relationships to which vicarious liability applies. Of course, the non-delegable 
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duty of care at common law is not subject to this limitation and already applies to 
independent contractors. There is much to commend the application of any 
proposed statutory duty to a broader range of workers who may be engaged or 
utilised by an institution in the care of children than the limited scope of 
vicarious liability at common law given the increasing diversity of working 
relationships.84 
Secondly, the proposed duty may be broader in scope than vicarious liability 
as developed in Canada and England. This can be illustrated by example. If an 
institution employs a worker in an area with no or very limited responsibility for 
the care of children, such as a cleaner, gardener or office worker, and that person 
sexually abuses a child in the care of the institution, will the institution be liable? 
This question has been considered directly in Canada. There it has been held 
that public policy considerations require a ‘strong connection between what the 
employer was asking the employee to do (the risk created by the employer’s 
enterprise) and the wrongful act’,85 in the sense that ‘the employer significantly 
increased the risk of the harm by putting the employee in his or her position and 
requiring him to perform the assigned tasks’.86 In Bazley, McLachlin J observed 
that: 
Where vicarious liability is not closely and materially related to a risk introduced 
or enhanced by the employer, it serves no deterrent purpose, and relegates the 
employer to the status of an involuntary insurer.87 
The Court noted that otherwise, liability would be unlikely to have a 
significant deterrent effect as ‘short of closing the premises or discharging all 
employees, little can be done to avoid the random wrong’.88 In EB v Order of the 
Oblates of Mary Immaculate of the Province of British Columbia,89 the Supreme 
Court of Canada refused a claim to make the school vicariously liable for the 
sexual abuse of a child by a baker who was employed by the school. The school 
had given the baker no responsibility for or authorisation to have contact with 
children. It was held that ‘mere opportunity’ to abuse a child was not sufficient to 
impose liability. 90  The same policy question arises under English law and 
similarly requires a close connection between the abuse and the employee’s 
responsibilities to give rise to liability.91 
It is not entirely clear whether liability under the proposed non-delegable 
duty would extend to child sexual abuse by any person associated with the 
institution, or whether it is intended that it should be limited to liability for acts of 
                                                 
84 See also Ewan McKendrick, ‘Vicarious Liability and Independent Contractors – A Re-examination’ 
(1990) 53 Modern Law Review 770; Hugh Collins, ‘Independent Contractors and the Challenge of 
Vertical Disintegration to Employment Protection Laws’ (1990) 10 Oxford Journal of Legal Studies 353. 
85 Bazley [1999] 2 SCR 534, 560 [42] (McLachlin J) (emphasis added). 
86 Ibid (emphasis in original).  
87 Ibid 556 [36]. 
88 Ibid 561 [42] (McLachlin J). 
89 [2005] 3 SCR 45. 
90 (2005) 258 DLR (4th) 385, [40], approved in EB v Order of the Oblates of Mary Immaculate of the 
Province of British Columbia [2005] 3 SCR 45, 52 [3] (Binnie J). 
91 Catholic Child Welfare [2013] 2 AC 1, 26 [86]–[87] (Lord Phillips).  
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persons with specific responsibilities in relation to a child such that it could be 
said that ‘the employer significantly increased the risk of the harm by putting the 
employee in his or her position and requiring him to perform the assigned 
tasks’.92 Recommendation 89 contains no limitation, but the discussion in the 
Redress and Civil Litigation Report in places suggests some limitation. The 
Report states: 
A non-delegable duty is a personal duty borne by the institution. It cannot be 
delegated. Where this duty is recognised, the institution must ensure that 
reasonable care is taken by those to whom it entrusts the performance of its duty 
of care. Sexual abuse of a child is the deliberate act of the perpetrator. It is the 
antithesis of the taking of reasonable care. Where a person associated with an 
institution fails to take reasonable care of a child in the care and control of that 
institution, by that person committing a criminal act against the child a strict 
liability regime will impose liability on the institution for that failure.93  
If the reference to ‘those to whom it entrusts the performance of its duty of 
care’94 means those particular associates to whom responsibilities for the care and 
supervision of children are given, it may end up with a similar scope to the 
Bazley test under vicarious liability. If so, liability would probably not arise in 
the hypothetical scenario above. However, if the proposed liability is drafted 
without limitation, this may render the relevant institutions the insurers of all 
harm arising from the ‘mere opportunity’ that association with the institution 
presents. The public policy justifications of any broader scope than that available 
in other common law jurisdictions ought to be clarified if this is intended. 
 
(b) Experience of Other Common Law Jurisdictions in Vicarious Liability 
As already discussed, other common law jurisdictions have developed 
vicarious liability principles rather than the non-delegable duty of care to address 
institutional liability for child sexual abuse. These developments in Canada95 and 
the United Kingdom96 have been approved by the Court of Final Appeal in Hong 
Kong97 and by the Court of Appeal in Singapore.98 
One issue is whether Australian legislators should adopt a path of statutory 
reform which follows more closely the common law developments in Canada 
and England, rather than modelling it upon a development to common law non-
delegable duty which has not in fact been adopted previously in Australia or 
elsewhere. The reason for considering a statutory duty modelled upon this 
existing, expanded form of vicarious liability is this. As Lord Neuberger P noted 
in FHR European Ventures LLP v Cedar Capital Partners LLC, it is desirable for 
                                                 
92 Bazley [1999] 2 SCR 534, 560 [42] (McLachlin J), quoted in Catholic Child Welfare [2013] 2 AC 1, 22 
[64] (Lord Phillips).  
93 Redress and Civil Litigation Report, above n 1, 490 (emphasis added). 
94 Ibid. 
95 Bazley [1999] 2 SCR 534. 
96 Lister v Hesley Hall Pty Ltd [2002] 1 AC 215; Catholic Child Welfare [2013] 2 AC 1. 
97 Ming An Insurance Co (HK) Ltd v Ritz-Carlton Ltd [2002] HKLRD 884. 
98 Skandinaviska Enskilda Banken AB (Publ), Singapore Branch v Asia Pacific Breweries (Singapore) Pte 
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common law jurisdictions ‘to lean in favour of harmonising the development of 
the common law round the world’.99 In Hasler v Singtel Optus Pty Ltd Leeming 
JA endorsed the remark of Lord Neuberger P, and observed that ‘[t]here is 
frequently much to be learnt from the experience of other jurisdictions whose 
legal systems share a common ancestor’.100 It may be of value to legislators and 
courts applying any proposed liability, to have recourse to the experience of other 
common law countries in the same context. For example, in Bazley the Court 
considered the factors relevant to determining the sufficiency of the connection101 
and set out specific factors relevant to determining whether an employer had 
introduced or significantly exacerbated the specific risk of sexual abuse by the 
nature of the responsibilities given to the employee. 102  Such prior judicial 
experience with the same or similar issues may be of assistance to Australian 
courts. 
 
(c) A ‘Subspecies’ of Negligence: Contentious Application of Non-delegable 
Duties to Criminal Intentional Wrongdoing 
The non-delegable duty has been previously described as a ‘sub-species of 
negligence law’103 and this raises a further issue with describing the proposed 
statutory duty by reference to this common law duty. Whether the tort of 
negligence can extend to intentional wrongdoing is not settled.104 However, the 
application of a negligence-based duty to criminal intentional wrongdoing is 
particularly contentious and was rejected by a majority of the High Court in 
Lepore. 105  As already noted, in Lepore Gleeson CJ (with whom Callinan J 
agreed) 106  expressed concern that criminally intentional conduct introduced a 
                                                 
99 [2015] AC 250, 273 [45]. 
100 (2014) 87 NSWLR 609, 626 [71]. 
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570; Blackwater v Plint [2005] 3 SCR 3. 
102 These included: whether ‘an employee is permitted or required to be alone with a child for extended 
periods of time’; supervising activities such as bathing or toileting or permitting physical contact with 
intimate body zones; putting the employee in a position of intimacy with and power over the child (which 
‘may enhance the risk of the employee feeling that he or she is able to take advantage of the child and the 
child submitting without effective complaint’); encouraging ‘the employee to stand in a position of 
respect’ and encouraging the child to emulate or obey: [1999] 2 SCR 534, 561–2 [43]–[44] (McLachlin 
J).  
103 Murphy, above n 47, 99. 
104 See Peter Handford, ‘Intentional Negligence: A Contradiction in Terms?’ (2010) 32 Sydney Law Review 
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Milotin (1957) 97 CLR 465, 470 (The Court). In Catholic Child Welfare [2013] 2 AC 1, 21 [62], Lord 
Phillips also noted that ‘sexual abuse can never be a negligent way of performing such a requirement [of 
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105 (2003) 212 CLR 511. 
106 Ibid 624 [340]. 
2016 Tort Law Reform for Survivors of Institutional Child Sexual Abuse 569
‘factor of legal relevance’ which took it outside the scope of the duty of care in 
negligence and the non-delegable duty.107 If the proposed statutory non-delegable 
duty were to include such criminally intentional conduct, there is the potential for 
it to influence the development of the common law doctrine through the process 
of analogical reasoning by which courts have regard to statutory context in the 
development of common law.108 As noted by Leeming JA writing extra-curially: 
In short, statutes are an under-appreciated component in the academic literature on 
the Australian legal system: their role lies not merely in stating norms of law, but 
in influencing judge-made law and as a critical driver of change and restraint in 
the Australian legal system.109 
Civil compensation for negligence extending to criminally intentional 
conduct would be a profound shift in tort law. This is not to suggest that change 
to the common law would necessarily occur, or that if it did, it would happen 
directly or abruptly or immediately. It is merely to flag that there is the potential 
for influence upon the common law from such statutory development. 
At the end of the day, both common law doctrines of vicarious liability and 
the non-delegable duty achieve the same purpose of imposing strict liability for 
the acts of another in the absence of fault on the part of the defendant. Both have 
limitations at common law which impact on the availability of tortious 
compensation in institutional child sexual abuse cases. A new statutory duty in 
the form of a non-delegable duty as proposed is of course possible. However, 
framed as a ‘non-delegable duty’ it would lack coherence with other common 
law jurisdictions and there are no apparent advantages to using this form to 
achieve the desired aim of imposing strict liability upon certain institutions for 
child sexual abuse (with or without limitation upon the circumstances of such 
abuse). 
It is not strictly necessary to use either of the existing common law duties as 
the form for the imposition of such strict liability, but a statutory liability based 
on an expanded vicarious liability would avoid any potential difficulty with 
applying a negligence-based liability to criminally intentional wrongdoing and 
would give courts closer comparison with existing common law case law for 
reference in considering institutional liability in this context. The limitations of 
vicarious liability with respect to a requirement for an employment relationship 
can be removed in the manner proposed by the Royal Commission regardless of 
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whether the form of liability more closely resembles common law vicarious 
liability or a non-delegable duty. 
 
2 Statutory Liability with a Reverse Onus of Proof 
The Royal Commission has recommended that irrespective of whether a non-
delegable duty of care is imposed on certain types of institution by statute, 
legislation should be introduced to make all institutions liable for child sexual 
abuse by a broad range of associates ‘unless the institution proves it took 
reasonable steps to prevent the abuse’.110 Recommendation 91 of the Redress and 
Civil Litigation Report states: 
Irrespective of whether state and territory parliaments legislate to impose a non-
delegable duty upon institutions, state and territory governments should introduce 
legislation to make institutions liable for institutional child sexual abuse by 
persons associated with the institution unless the institution proves it took 
reasonable steps to prevent the abuse. The ‘reverse onus’ should be imposed on all 
institutions, including those institutions in respect of which we do not recommend 
a non-delegable duty be imposed.111 
Significantly, this proposed statutory liability would apply to all institutions 
including community, not-for-profit and volunteer organisations as well as 
organisations administering foster care or kinship care. Some of these types of 
organisations have traditionally not fallen within the scope of vicarious liability 
at common law (for example foster care)112 and so statutory inclusion would 
assist in providing causes of action which are not presently available at common 
law. It would also apply to those organisations to which the Commission’s 
proposed non-delegable duty of care would apply. There is no doubt that the 
proposed statutory vicarious liability would assist survivors of future abuse to 
establish institutional liability, but again, it leaves existing survivors without any 
improvement of their current position.113 
Recommendation 91 is in essence proposing a statutory form of vicarious 
liability that is not strict. This is something unknown to the common law, though 
not unknown in statute law. There are two important features of this proposed 
duty. 
Firstly, there is no apparent requirement for any particular connection 
between the abuse and the institution beyond the requirement for the abuser to be 
an ‘associate’ of the institution.114 If so, the recommended provision has a much 
                                                 
110 Redress and Civil Litigation Report, above n 1, 495, recs 91–2. The recommendation is that all 
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broader scope than vicarious liability at common law. For example, under this 
proposed liability, a sporting club may be liable for abuse by a cleaner or person 
such as the baker in EB v Order of the Oblates of Mary Immaculate of the 
Province of British Columbia (unless the defence of having taken reasonable 
steps to prevent abuse can be raised).115 This would be of considerable advantage 
to survivors, but it has significant public policy implications. 
As discussed in relation to the scope of the non-delegable duty, under 
Canadian and English vicarious liability, public policy has required balancing the 
interests of survivors in having a defendant to sue on the one hand, against 
‘[foisting] undue burdens on business enterprises’116 rendering them ‘involuntary 
insurers’117 for all sexual abuse on the other. Courts in Canada and England 
considering the public policy questions have found that liability for all child 
sexual abuse is not justified and so liability is limited to circumstances where the 
institution has ‘significantly increased the risk of harm by putting the employee 
in his or her position and requiring him to perform the assigned tasks’.118 This is 
not to say that the same public policy issues could not be debated and resolved 
differently in Australia. For example, it may be determined that the existence of 
the proposed defence, discussed below, renders it fair to expand the scope of this 
second liability. However, these issues will need to be fully addressed by 
legislators considering the implementation of reforms, as where the defence 
cannot be raised, the scope of the liability is significantly broader. 
Secondly, this new statutory liability may be avoided upon proof by the 
institution that it took reasonable care to prevent abuse, effectively creating a 
defence to vicarious liability that is unknown to the common law. These reforms 
appear 119  to be based upon provisions in the Commonwealth and Victorian 
discrimination legislation 120  which provide that where an employee or agent 
acting in the course of their employment contravenes the Act, then the employer 
or principal will be vicariously liable unless it can establish that it took 
reasonable precautions to prevent the contravention. 121  The difference is that 
liability under these provisions is limited, as is common law vicarious liability, 
by the twin requirements of an employment relationship and a sufficient 
connection with the employment. 
The proposed defence, or so-called reverse onus of proof, is a significant 
advantage to institutions which does not exist at common law. The implication of 
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the proposed defence appears to be that if the institution does not take reasonable 
precautions to prevent sexual abuse, then it is fair that it is made liable for any 
abuse. Conversely, if an institution does take reasonable steps (whatever they 
might be) to prevent abuse it will escape liability, even if the nature of the 
responsibilities given to the perpetrator would be accepted in other jurisdictions 
as having significantly increased the risk of sexual abuse occurring, and therefore 
warranting the imposition of vicarious liability. It may result in finding or 
denying vicarious liability where, on the same facts, a different result would be 
likely in other common law jurisdictions. 
The Royal Commission recognised that what are reasonable steps for an 
institution to take to avoid child sexual abuse will vary depending upon the type 
of institution and the position and responsibility of the abuser within the 
institution. More active steps toward precaution might be expected of a for-profit 
institution than a community-volunteer institution. These questions will depend 
on many individual circumstances but will no doubt involve complex factual 
issues such as reasonable foreseeability of risk, and the kinds of matters typically 
relevant to a finding of negligence.122 The Royal Commission recognised that 
institutions are in a far superior position to plaintiffs to be able to prove the 
precautions taken to prevent abuse, having relatively easy access to records and 
witnesses.123 Yet, inevitably the survivor plaintiff would bear an evidentiary onus 
which may be difficult to discharge. 
The Commission recognised that its recommendation, if adopted, may lead to 
increased insurance premiums for institutions but that it would also potentially 
engender higher standards of care, governance and risk mitigation within 
institutions.124 The social benefit of encouraging all institutions to do more to 
reduce the risk of child sexual abuse goes without saying. However, the 
uncertainty as to what would constitute reasonable steps to prevent abuse may be 
of concern, especially to small community groups. 
The interrelationship between the two proposed liabilities is not entirely 
clear. Presumably, institutions to which both the non-delegable duty and the 
statutory liability apply may be liable under the former even in circumstances in 
which the defence can be raised to the latter. However, when would those 
institutions be liable under the second statutory duty and not liable under the non-
delegable duty? One answer might be that the non-delegable duty is limited in 
scope to acts of abuse by persons with responsibility for welfare of children. If 
abuse by a non-childcare worker, such as a cleaner, does not fall within the scope 
of the non-delegable duty, it might still fall within the scope of the statutory 
liability. In such circumstances, an institution to which the non-delegable duty 
applies could be liable under the second statutory liability if it cannot make out 
the defence that it took reasonable steps to prevent abuse. 
 
                                                 
122 Often referred to as the ‘Shirt calculus’, referring to Wyong Shire Council v Shirt (1980) 146 CLR 40. 
123 Redress and Civil Litigation Report, above n 1, 494. 
124 Ibid. 
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E   Dual Vicarious Liability: Reform to Impose  
Liability upon more than One Institution 
Under Australian common law, it is not possible for two parties to be 
vicariously liable for a defendant’s wrong. 125  The position is otherwise in 
England.126 In Catholic Child Welfare,127 Lord Phillips approved the dicta of Rix 
LJ in Viasystems (Tyneside) Ltd v Thermal Transfer (Northern) Ltd that what the 
court looks for is ‘a situation where the employee in question … is so much a 
part of the work, business or organisation of both employers that it is just to make 
both employers answer for his negligence’.128 
Lord Phillips held that the relationship of the tortfeasor with each defendant 
determines whether the defendant is liable.129 In that case, the diocesan bodies 
responsible under statute for managing a residential school for boys left it to ‘the 
Institute’, a lay Roman Catholic order, to nominate a headmaster and appoint the 
teachers from brother members of the Institute. The brothers entered into 
contracts with the diocesan bodies but it was the relationship of the brothers with 
the Institute which enabled their placement as teachers in the school. Lord 
Phillips held that it was ‘fair, just and reasonable’ for vicarious liability for child 
sexual abuse by brother teachers to be shared by the two defendants.130 
In Day v The Ocean Beach Hotel Shellharbour Pty Ltd,131 Leeming JA noted 
that there were statutory forms of dual vicarious liability under Australian law,132 
but that short of legislative reform, the acceptance of dual vicarious liability 
would have to come from the High Court.133 The issue was not addressed by the 
Royal Commission in its Report. However, as has been recognised in England, 
there is no persuasive reason why the law should not be reformed to permit a 
court to find more than one defendant vicariously liable for institutional child 
sexual abuse in circumstances where the abuser is part of the ‘work, business or 
organisation’ of more than one institution. 
 
F   The Argument for Statutory Reform Rather than Common Law 
Development 
As already noted, the Royal Commission recommends statutory reform to 
bring clarity and certainty to the availability of compensation. The reasons which 
support statutory reform to the basis of institutional liability currently provided 
                                                 
125 Oceanic Crest Shipping Co v Pilbara Harbour Services Pty Ltd (1986) 160 CLR 626, applied in Day v 
The Ocean Beach Hotel Shellharbour Pty Ltd (2013) 85 NSWLR 335, 334–46 [23]–[33] (Leeming JA). 
126 See Viasystems (Tyneside) Ltd v Thermal Transfer (Northern) Ltd [2006] 2 WLR 428. 
127 [2013] 2 AC 1, 17 [43]. 
128 [2006] 2 WLR 428, 453 [79]. 
129 Catholic Child Welfare [2013] 2 AC 1, 18 [45].  
130 Ibid 27 [94]. 
131 (2013) 85 NSWLR 335. 
132 Ibid 344 [25]. Leeming JA referred to s 917C of the Corporations Act (Cth) as an example of a provision 
pursuant to which multiple holders of Australian financial services licences may be liable for the conduct 
of a single authorised representative. 
133 Ibid 346 [33]. 
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by the common law of tort, as opposed to leaving it to be developed by the 
courts, are considered briefly here. 
 
1 Unpredictability of Common Law Reform 
First and foremost, there is simply no guarantee that common law 
development will occur at all in Australia, or with in any predictable time frame. 
The High Court last considered these issues in Lepore in 2003.134 That decision 
had no clear ratio, contributing to the problems faced now. There are fixed 
criteria to meet before the High Court will grant special leave to appeal and 
particular criteria to satisfy before it will reconsider its earlier decisions.135 The 
case needs to be the appropriate vehicle to determine the issues with the relevant 
question ‘in dispute’. Courts are restricted to deciding only the issues in the case 
before the court.136 All these factors stand in the way of timely change to the 
common law by the courts. This is a particular burden for elderly and unwell 
survivors. 
 
2 Advantages of Legislative Reform 
The legislature on the other hand is not limited by the circumstances of any 
particular court case so reforms can be introduced more quickly and 
comprehensively. Legislative provisions are capable of having a normative effect 
on practices and systems, an issue of considerable significance with respect to the 
alteration of institutional practices in response to notification of child sexual 
abuse, or the employment or management of staff in high risk positions. The law 
reform process is also capable of being consultative in a way that is not open to 
the judiciary.137 
As has been pointed out in Morgans v Lauchbury, creating a special rule for a 
particular class of case in the context of a common law principle is generally the 
function of the legislature.138 A stand-alone statutory regime would also avoid 
unintended consequences which might result from reforms that were enacted as 
amendments to existing civil liability legislation.139 
 
                                                 
134 (2003) 212 CLR 511. 
135 See John v Federal Commissioner of Taxation (1989) 166 CLR 417, 438–9 (Mason CJ, Wilson, Dawson, 
Toohey and Gaudron JJ); Matthew Harding and Ian Malkin ‘Overruling in the High Court of Australia in 
Common Law Cases’ (2010) 34 Melbourne University Law Review 519. 
136 See especially the discussion of these issues in Barbara McDonald, ‘Law Reform and Private Law: The 
Role of Legislation in Supplementing or Supplanting the Common Law’ (Paper presented at Fifty Years 
of the Law Commission: The Dynamics of Law Reform Now, Then and Next – An International 
Conference, United Kingdom Supreme Court, London, 10–11 July 2015). 
137 Ibid.  
138 [1973] AC 127, 136–7 (Lord Wilberforce), 142–3 (Lord Pearson), 145–6 (Lord Cross), 151 (Lord 
Scarman), cited with approval in Scott v Davis (2000) 204 CLR 333, 340 [10] (Gleeson CJ). 
139 In this regard we note that the Ipp reforms which have been at least partially enacted in all Australian 
jurisdictions were not intended to address intentional torts including sexual battery: Ipp Report, above n 
104, 1, rec 2 [2.2]–[2.3]. 
2016 Tort Law Reform for Survivors of Institutional Child Sexual Abuse 575
3 Precedent for Statutory Reform of Tort Law and Vicarious Liability 
Legislative intervention in the common law of tort is not new,140 and has 
since the 19th century been used in various discrete areas to extend tortious 
liability,141 or in some instances to augment the common law by way of statutory 
schemes142 or codes.143 It is also noteworthy that there are precedents for specific 
statutory reforms to the common law of vicarious liability. 144  In these 
circumstances, there are strong reasons to consider statutory reform in Australia 
to provide a comprehensive package of reforms to assist survivors. 
 
4 Uniformity 
One of the important opportunities that law reform would offer is the 
prospect that uniform statutory reform could be introduced in all states and 
territories, by agreement of the Attorneys-General.145 Survivors should have the 
same rights and options regardless of the jurisdiction in which compensation is 
                                                 
140 For a comprehensive discussion see Barbara McDonald, ‘Legislative Intervention in the Law of 
Negligence: The Common Law, Statutory Interpretation and Tort Reform in Australia’ (2005) 27 Sydney 
Law Review 443. 
141 See, eg, statutory provisions which make contributory negligence a ground for reduction of damages 
instead of a complete defence which was formerly the case at common law: Law Reform (Miscellaneous 
Provisions) Act 1955 (ACT) pt 5; Law Reform (Miscellaneous Provisions) Act 1965 (NSW) pt 3; Law 
Reform (Miscellaneous Provisions) Act 1956 (NT) pt V; Law Reform Act 1995 (Qld) pt 3 div 3; Law 
Reform (Contributory Negligence and Apportionment of Liability) Act 2001 (SA) s 7; Wrongs Act 1954 
(Tas) s 4; Wrongs Act 1958 (Vic) pt V; Law Reform (Contributory Negligence and Tortfeasors 
Contribution) Act 1947 (WA); Law Reform (Contributory Negligence) Act 1945 (UK). 
142 Workmen’s Compensation Act 1897 (UK). Current Australian legislation is: Safety, Rehabilitation and 
Compensation Act 1988 (Cth); Seafarers Rehabilitation and Compensation Act 1992 (Cth); Workers 
Compensation Act 1951 (ACT); Workers Compensation Act 1987 (NSW); Workplace Injury Management 
and Workers Compensation Act 1998 (NSW); Workers Rehabilitation and Compensation Act 1986 (NT); 
WorkCover Queensland Act 1996 (Qld); Workers Rehabilitation and Compensation Act 1986 (SA); 
Workers Rehabilitation and Compensation Act 1988 (Tas); Accident Compensation Act 1985 (Vic); 
Workers’ Compensation and Injury Management Act 1981 (WA). There is also special legislation in 
some states dealing with particular types of industry or claim: see, eg, Workers’ Compensation (Dust 
Diseases) Act 1942 (NSW).  
143 For example, defamation law in Australian jurisdictions is partially codified: Civil Law (Wrongs) Act 
2002 (ACT) ch 9; Defamation Act 2005 (NSW); Defamation Act 2006 (NT); Defamation Act 2005 (Qld); 
Defamation Act 2005 (SA); Defamation Act 2005 (Tas); Defamation Act 2005 (Vic); Defamation Act 
2005 (WA). 
144 For example, it was formerly the position at common law that the performance of a police officer’s duties 
was in public service and not by reason of being an employee, so that at common law the state could not 
be held vicariously liable for tortious acts of a police officer. This was reversed by specific legislation 
introduced in all jurisdictions, albeit not simultaneously. See Australian Federal Police Act 1979 (Cth) s 
64B; Law Reform (Vicarious Liability) Act 1983 (NSW) s 8; Police Service Administration Act 1978 
(NT) s 148C; Police Service Administration Act 1990 (Qld) s 10.5; Police Act 1998 (SA) s 65; Police 
Service Act 2003 (Tas) s 84; Police Regulation Act 1958 (Vic) s 123; Police Act 1982 (WA) s 137. Note 
that the Australian Federal Police Act 1979 (Cth) also applies to the ACT: at s 5A. 
145 It would be desirable not to repeat the experience of the tort law reforms: see Civil Law (Wrongs) Act 
2002 (ACT); Civil Liability Act 2002 (NSW); Personal Injuries (Liabilities and Damages) Act 2003 
(NT); Civil Liability Act 2003 (Qld); Civil Liability Act 1936 (SA); Civil Liability Act 2002 (Tas); Wrongs 
Act 1958 (Vic); Civil Liability Act 2002 (WA). These statutes were enacted by Australian Parliaments in 
2002–03 following the Ipp Report. Uniformity was unfortunately not achieved, though in some instances, 
similar but not identical provisions were enacted. 
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sought or in which abuse occurred. Statutory reforms to the common law of tort 
are, of course, constitutionally within the powers of state and territory 
Parliaments rather than the federal Parliament. However, it is to be hoped that 
there would be cooperation between all state and territory Attorneys-General in 
order to achieve a national uniform approach to these reforms. 
 
G   Prospective or Retrospective Reform? 
Consideration must be given to the critical question of whether reforms to 
impose institutional liability should be prospective only or given retrospective 
operation. The Royal Commission has stipulated that its proposed statutory 
reforms should have prospective application only.146 
The law has an appropriate and abiding caution with respect to retrospective 
law reform, which sits uneasily with the rule of law. It is considered to be 
potentially prejudicial to parties who may have arranged their affairs based upon 
the state of the law at the time and has particular significance in relation to 
criminal liability. 147  However, there are several reasons why exceptional 
consideration should be given to retrospective reform of civil liability of 
institutions for child sexual abuse. 
The most significant reason is that if comparable changes were made to the 
common law by the courts, they would have retrospective effect anyway, as 
acknowledged by the Royal Commission.148 In the United States Supreme Court 
in Kuhn v Fairmont, Holmes J observed that ‘[j]udicial decisions have had 
retrospective operation for near a thousand years’.149 This has already occurred in 
other jurisdictions that have clarified the scope of vicarious liability. However, 
the Royal Commission suggests that legislation should be enacted to avoid  
the likelihood that Australian courts go down a similar path. 150  The Royal 
Commission reasoned that retrospective application was not appropriate because 
‘relevant institutions would face potentially large and effectively new liability for 
abuse that has already occurred’,151 and that retrospective insurance would be in 
all likelihood unaffordable, and referred to ‘the burden that retrospective  
change would impose on insurers or institutions that will not have insured against 
this liability’.152 These issues are undeniable. However, the Royal Commission  
did not explain why they warrant a different approach in Australia to other  
common law jurisdictions which have already expanded vicarious liability with 
retrospective effect. 
                                                 
146 Redress and Civil Litigation Report, above n 1, 495, rec 93. 
147 See, eg, Australian Law Reform Commission, Traditional Rights and Freedoms – Encroachment by 
Commonwealth Laws, Interim Report No 127 (2015) 250. 
148 Redress and Civil Litigation Report, above n 1, 491. 
149 215 US 349, 372 (1910). See also M L Friedland, ‘Prospective and Retrospective Judicial Lawmaking’ 
(1974) 24 University of Toronto Law Journal 170. 
150 Redress and Civil Litigation Report, above n 1, 491. 
151 Ibid 491–2. 
152 Ibid 491. 
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With respect to difficulties in defending proceedings arising from significant 
effluxion of time from the date of alleged abuse, courts have the power to stay 
any proceedings in which prejudice could be established. However, without 
retrospective operation for institutional liability, a significant proportion of the 
claims of those survivors who might be in a position to bring proceedings would 
be unmaintainable. Retrospective reform to limitation periods alone as proposed 
by the Royal Commission will be of very limited utility to existing survivors if 
they have no sustainable cause of action. They will be in the same position they 
are now. 
The Royal Commission’s recommendations assume the implementation of a 
national redress scheme, which would certainly afford some financial 
compensation to survivors of past abuse. On one level, this appears to reduce the 
need for retrospective reform. However, there is no guarantee that the redress 
scheme will be implemented in the manner proposed by the Royal Commission, 
and even if it is, the justification for denying retrospective reform by statute 
which could be achieved in a similar manner by common law development is not 
clear. This is particularly so where in other common law jurisdictions, survivors 
of past abuse already have access to such retrospective action. 
Another issue for legislators to consider is that it is not necessary to limit 
consideration of retrospectivity to the particular statutory reforms proposed  
by the Royal Commission. An option would be the implementation of a  
statutory vicarious liability for survivors of past abuse in a manner comparable  
to the vicarious liability imposed in other common law jurisdictions with 
retrospective operation, even if other reforms such as the proposed duty and 
statutory liability are enacted with prospective operation only. This would give 
Australian survivors of past abuse comparable rights to those which exist 
currently in other jurisdictions; not greater, but not less, as is currently proposed 
by the Commission. 
 
III   OPERATION OF CIVIL LIABILITY (TORT REFORM) 
LEGISLATION 
The potential application of state and territory civil liability legislation to 
survivors’ claims against institutions in the tort of negligence is an important 
consideration in respect of which the Royal Commission has made no 
recommendations. This was no doubt because the Royal Commission’s 
recommendations were for statutory causes of action imposing institutional 
liability for deliberate conduct by others. Civil liability legislation across 
Australian jurisdictions generally excludes causes of action in respect of 
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deliberate conduct from the legislation.153 But given that survivors of historical 
abuse will not have the benefit of any prospective reform, consideration should 
be given to the application of civil liability legislation to historical claims which 
may be brought in battery or may depend on causes of action in negligence. 
There are various aspects of the civil liability legislation154 that, because they are 
not uniform,155 would have differential effects on claims by survivors depending 
on the jurisdiction in which claims were brought. Given the widespread nature of 
institutional child sexual abuse across Australia, it would be appropriate to ensure 
that all claims would be decided on the same common law principles. In this Part 
we consider the civil liability provisions most likely to affect claims concerning 
institutional child sexual abuse: those dealing with the liability of public 
authorities, claims for psychiatric injury and the restrictions on damages. 
 
A   Public Authority Defendants 
In most Australian jurisdictions,156  civil liability legislation makes special 
provision with regard to the liability in negligence of public authorities. 157 
However, there are significant jurisdictional differences between them. Generally 
they restrict the circumstances in which public authorities will be subject to a 
duty of care and set out principles which the courts must consider on the issues of 
imposition of a duty of care on an authority, or breach of a duty of care by an 
authority.158 It has been judicially recognised that in some cases these provisions 
                                                 
153 In SA the legislation applies only to ‘accidents caused wholly or in part by negligence or some other 
unintentional tort’: Civil Liability Act 1936 (SA) s 51(a)(ii). In Queensland the Civil Liability Act 2003 
(Qld) applies to ‘any civil claim for damages or harm’ so that apparently the intentional torts are not 
excluded though it has been argued that the relevant provisions can be interpreted otherwise: Tina 
Cockburn and Bill Madden, ‘Intentional Torts to the Person, Compensation for Injury and the Civil 
Liability Acts – Recent Cases and Contemporary Issues’ (2007) 18 Insurance Law Journal 1. Similar 
approaches apply in Civil Liability (Wrongs) Act 2002 (ACT) s 93; Personal Injuries (Liabilities and 
Damages) Act 2003 (NT) s 4(1). Provisions in Civil Liability Act 2002 (Tas) s 3B(1)(a); Wrongs Act 1958 
(Vic) ss 28C(2)(a), 28LC(2)(a); Civil Liability Act 2002 (WA) s 3B(1) all take an approach similar to the 
NSW legislation excluding intentional acts done with intent to cause injury: Civil Liability Act 2002 
(NSW) s 3B. 
154 The reform legislation was based on the recommendations of the Ipp Report, above n 104. 
155 Civil Liability (Wrongs) Act 2002 (ACT); Civil Liability Act 2002 (NSW); Personal Injuries (Liabilities 
and Damages) Act 2003 (NT); Civil Liability Act 2003 (Qld); Civil Liability Act 1936 (SA); Civil 
Liability Act 2002 (Tas); Wrongs Act 1958 (Vic); Civil Liability Act 2002 (WA). 
156 Excepting SA and NT. 
157 Civil Law (Wrongs) Act 2002 (ACT) ch 8; Civil Liability Act 2002 (NSW) pt 5; Civil Liability Act 2003 
(Qld) pt 3; Civil Liability Act 2002 (Tas) pt 9; Wrongs Act 1958 (Vic) pt XII; Civil Liability Act 2002 
(WA) ss 5U–5Z. In SA s 42 of the Civil Liability Act 1936 (SA) applies to road authorities only. In the 
NT, there is no specific applicable civil liability legislation. 
158 Those include: that an authority’s functions are limited by financial and other resources; that the general 
allocation of resources is not open to question; that the functions required of an authority are to be 
determined by reference to its broad range of activities; and that authorities may rely on compliance with 
general procedures as evidence of proper exercise of functions. See Civil Law (Wrongs) Act 2002 (ACT) 
s 110; Civil Liability Act 2002 (NSW) s 42; Civil Liability Act 2003 (Qld) s 35; Civil Liability Act 2002 
(Tas) s 38; Wrongs Act 1958 (Vic) s 83; Civil Liability Act 2002 (WA) s 5W. 
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produce the same result as the application of common law principles,159 but that is 
not so in all cases. 
It will be the case that some institutional defendants in negligence claims for 
child sexual abuse will be public authorities within the definitions in the civil 
liability statutes. In New South Wales for example, the definition of a public or 
other authority includes, among others, a government department, a public health 
organisation or a public or local authority constituted by or under an Act.160 
Notably, the New South Wales provision would include government and non-
government schools.161 In order to avoid differential treatment of institutional 
defendants which are statutory authorities, it would be desirable to ensure that the 
relevant civil liability legislation does not apply to institutional defendants in 
cases of child sexual abuse. 
 
B   Psychiatric Injury 
In most cases of child sexual abuse, the plaintiff’s damage consists of 
psychiatric harm. Survivors of institutional child sexual abuse may wish to claim 
against an institution in the tort of negligence. In all Australian jurisdictions162 
except Queensland and the Northern Territory, civil liability legislation governs 
claims in respect of negligently inflicted psychiatric injury.163  The provisions 
have some application to all cases of psychiatric harm, whether pure mental harm 
or mental harm that is consequent on physical injury. While the legislation is not 
uniform across jurisdictions, generally the effect is to restrict recovery for pure 
mental harm to recognised psychiatric illness164 and to limit the duty of care not 
to cause mental harm to instances where it was foreseeable that a person of 
normal fortitude might suffer a recognised psychiatric illness if reasonable care 
were not taken.165 The legislation is not radically different from the Australian 
common law concerning the duty of care not to cause mental harm,166 but it must 
                                                 
159 Roads and Traffic Authority of New South Wales v Refrigerated Roadways Pty Ltd (2009) 77 NSWLR 
360, 400 [188] (Campbell JA). For the common law principles, see Graham Barclay Oysters Pty Ltd v 
Ryan (2002) 211 CLR 540; Crimmins v Stevedoring Industry Finance Committee (1999) 200 CLR 1. 
160 Civil Liability Act 2002 (NSW) s 41. 
161 Pursuant to Civil Liability Regulation 2014 (NSW), non-government schools are prescribed as authorities 
to whom the relevant part of the Act applies. 
162 Following the recommendations of the Ipp Report, above n 104, 136 [9.5]. 
163 See Civil Law (Wrongs) Act 2002 (ACT) pt 3.2; Civil Liability Act 2002 (NSW) pt 3; Civil Liability Act 
1936 (SA) s 33; Civil Liability Act 2002 (Tas) pt 8; Wrongs Act 1958 (Vic) pt XI; Civil Liability Act 2002 
(WA) s 5S. 
164 Civil Law (Wrongs) Act 2002 (ACT) ss 34(1), 35; Civil Liability Act 2002 (NSW) s 31; Civil Liability Act 
1936 (SA) s 53(2); Civil Liability Act 2002 (Tas) s 33; Wrongs Act 1958 (Vic) s 72(1); Civil Liability Act 
2002 (WA) s 5S(1). 
165 Civil Law (Wrongs) Act 2002 (ACT) s 34; Civil Liability Act 2002 (NSW) s 32; Civil Liability Act 1936 
(SA) s 33; Civil Liability Act 2002 (Tas) s 34; Wrongs Act 1958 (Vic) s 72; Civil Liability Act 2002 (WA) 
s 5S. 
166 Tame v New South Wales (2002) 211 CLR 317. For commentary, see Peter Handford ‘Psychiatric Injury: 
The New Era’ (2003) 11 Tort Law Review 13; Koehler v Cerebos (Aust) Ltd (2005) 222 CLR 44. 
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necessarily include some subtle differences which will inevitably depend on 
future judicial interpretation of the provisions.167 
In the case of consequential mental harm it would be necessary under the 
legislation for the plaintiff to establish a duty of care in respect of the mental 
harm independently of any duty of care in respect of the physical injury on which 
the mental injury is consequent: a separate duty of care in respect of the 
consequential mental harm.168 This is not the case at common law where only one 
duty of care in respect of the physical injury need be established. At common law 
the chief issues for determination in relation to a consequential mental injury 
would be questions of causation and remoteness.169 
Differential treatment of Australian plaintiffs could be avoided by ensuring 
that state and territory civil liability legislation does not apply to claims in respect 
of psychological injury caused by institutional child sexual abuse. 
 
C   Restrictions on Damages 
Civil liability legislation imposes severe limitations on personal injury 
damages. The legislation excludes certain causes of action170 and in New South 
Wales for example, the exclusions include cases where liability arises from ‘an 
intentional act that is done by the person with the intent to cause injury or death 
or that is sexual assault or other sexual misconduct committed by the person’.171 
So in New South Wales, a plaintiff’s claim in respect of a sexual battery against a 
perpetrator will not be subject to the very significant restrictions on personal 
injury compensatory damages imposed by Part 2 of the New South Wales Act or 
the prohibition on the award of exemplary, punitive and aggravated damages in 
section 21 of the New South Wales legislation which applies in respect of 
negligent conduct alone. In Tasmania, Victoria and Western Australia the 
position is similar to that in New South Wales.172 
An important issue is whether the restrictions imposed by the legislation 
would apply in a case where an institutional defendant is sued on the basis that it 
is vicariously liable for a deliberate sexual battery committed by another. A claim 
against that other person is clearly excluded from the operation of the legislation 
                                                 
167 The High Court has already interpreted one of the NSW provisions (Civil Liability Act 2002 (NSW) s 
30(2) relating to pure mental harm suffered by a plaintiff as a result of witnessing others ‘being killed, 
injured or put in peril’) as being narrower in scope than the common law: Wicks v State Rail Authority of 
NSW (2010) 241 CLR 60. 
168 Civil Law (Wrongs) Act 2002 (ACT) s 34; Civil Liability Act 2002 (NSW) s 32; Civil Liability Act 1936 
(SA) s 33; Civil Liability Act 2002 (Tas) s 34; Wrongs Act 1958 (Vic) s 72; Civil Liability Act 2002 (WA) 
s 5S. 
169 Mount Isa Mines Ltd v Pusey (1970) 125 CLR 383; Kavanagh v Akhtar (1998) 45 NSWLR 588. 
170 Civil Liability (Wrongs) Act 2002 (ACT) s 93; Civil Liability Act 2002 (NSW) s 3B(1); Personal Injuries 
(Liabilities and Damages) Act 2003 (NT) s 4(1); Civil Liability Act 2003 (Qld) ss 4–5; Civil Liability Act 
1936 (SA) s 51(a)(ii); Civil Liability Act 2002 (Tas) s 3B(1)(a); Wrongs Act 1958 (Vic) ss 28C(2)(a), 
28LC(2)(a); Civil Liability Act 2002 (WA) s 3B(1). 
171 Civil Liability Act 2002 (NSW) s 3B(1)(a).  
172 Civil Liability Act 2002 (Tas) s 3B(1)(a); Wrongs Act 1958 (Vic) ss 28C(2)(a), 28LC(2)(a); Civil Liability 
Act 2002 (WA) s 3B(1). 
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in New South Wales by virtue of section 3B(1)(a). The wording of the section 
might suggest that only the liability of the perpetrator is excluded because of the 
reference to ‘an intentional act that is done by the person … that is sexual assault 
committed by the person’.173 The New South Wales Court of Appeal interpreted 
the section in Zorom Enterprises Pty Ltd v Zabow174 and held that section 3B(1) 
‘does not differentiate in its operation between direct and vicarious liability’ and 
applies to exclude the operation of the Civil Liability Act 2002 (NSW) where a 
defendant is vicariously liable for the intentional tort of an employee.175 The 
position in other Australian jurisdictions may remain somewhat uncertain. 
In a negligence claim for breach of a duty of care by a survivor against an 
institutional defendant, the substantial restrictions on personal injury 
compensatory damages imposed by the civil liability legislation would apply. 
Various Australian jurisdictions restrict compensatory damages by imposing caps 
on damages for economic and non-economic loss, gratuitous services, and 
interest as well as thresholds for general damages.176 These would produce major 
inconsistencies and inequality resulting in under-compensation in many cases 
and differential compensation among survivors across Australia.177 The problem 
would be obviated by a clear statutory statement to the effect that a relevant state 
or territory civil liability enactment will not apply in respect of any claim (be it in 
trespass to person, negligence, or any other cause of action) for damages by 
survivors of institutional child sexual abuse. Common law principles concerning 
assessment of damages should apply to these cases. 
 
D   Aggravated and Exemplary Damages Should Be Available in Child 
Sexual Abuse Cases 
Consideration should be given to the availability of aggravated and 
exemplary damages for several reasons. Child sexual abuse is an egregious abuse 
of human rights.178 The conduct of perpetrators and those institutions that took 
few if any precautions against abuse, and in many instances ignored credible 
                                                 
173 Civil Liability Act 2002 (NSW), s 3B(1)(a)(emphasis added). 
174 (2007) 71 NSWLR 354. 
175 Ibid 358–9 [13]–[14] (Basten JA) (McColl and Campbell JJA agreeing). 
176 Civil Law (Wrongs) Act 2002 (ACT) pt 7; Civil Liability Act 2002 (NSW) pts 2, 2A; Personal Injuries 
(Liabilities and Damages) Act 2003 (NT) pt 4; Civil Liability Act 2003 (Qld) ch 3; Civil Liability Act 
1936 (SA) pt 8; Civil Liability Act 2002 (Tas) pt 7; Wrongs Act 1958 (Vic) pts VB, VBA; Civil Liability 
Act 2002 (WA) pt 2. 
177 Australian Lawyers Alliance, Submission to Royal Commission into Institutional Responses to Child 
Sexual Abuse, 28 February 2014, 23–5; NSW Bar Association, Submission to Royal Commission into 
Institutional Responses to Child Sexual Abuse, 31 March 2014, 5.  
178 Australia’s international law obligations (pursuant to the Universal Declaration of Human Rights, GA 
Res 217A (III), UN GAOR, 3rd sess, 183rd plen mtg, UN Doc A/810 (10 December 1948) and the 
International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights, opened for signature 16 December 1966, 999 
UNTS 171 (entered into force 23 March 1976) (‘ICCPR’)) include the provision of effective remedies for 
victims of human rights breaches. ICCPR art 2(3) provides that where a person’s rights have been 
violated, that person has a right to an ‘effective remedy’ including, where appropriate, compensation: 
Human Rights Committee, General Comment No 31: Nature of the General Legal Obligation Imposed on 
States Parties to the Covenant, 80th sess, UN Doc CCPR/C/21/Rev.1/Add.13 (26 May 2004) [15]–[16]. 
582 UNSW Law Journal Volume 39(2) 
reports of abuse, was reprehensible, with the gravest consequences for victims. 
The common law courts have long recognised that a ‘right must be supported by 
an effective sanction’.179 
Survivors are able to pursue aggravated and exemplary damages awards in 
trespass to person claims for sexual battery and other intentional torts against 
perpetrators. Though without statutory reform, aggravated and exemplary 
damages will not ordinarily be available in some states against institutional 
defendants where the cause of action is in the tort of negligence, because of tort 
reform legislation.180 
Aggravated damages are a form of general damages awarded  
as compensation for ‘high-handed, malicious, insulting or oppressive’ 181  
treatment or victimisation by humiliation182 or emotional distress.183 Aggravated 
damages are provided as compensation for intangible as well as substantive 
injury caused by the circumstances and manner of the defendant’s wrongdoing.184 
Exemplary damages are punitive in nature. Whereas aggravated damages focus 
on factors such as humiliation, embarrassment, shame, and emotional distress  
of the plaintiff, exemplary damages focus on the culpable behaviour of  
the defendant and are awarded as punishment, retribution and deterrence. 185 
Exemplary damages may be awarded where a defendant’s conduct is ‘high-
handed, insolent, vindictive or malicious’ or where the defendant has displayed a 
‘contumelious disregard of the plaintiff’s rights’.186 The sexual abuse of a child in 
an institution is such a grievous human rights abuse that common law principles 
might very often indicate the imposition of punitive damages. Exemplary 
damages have been awarded in many different tortious causes of action in 
Australia including in cases of battery187 and false imprisonment.188 The High 
Court has held that an award of both aggravated and exemplary damages is 
allowable and does not constitute a ‘double punishment’ where the quantum of 
each is not disproportionate, because the two are different in kind.189 
                                                 
179 Plenty v Dillon (1991) 171 CLR 635, 655 (Gaudron and McHugh JJ), quoting Geoffrey Samuel, ‘The 
Right Approach’ (1980) 96 Law Quarterly Review 12, 14, quoted in Hill v Higgins [2012] NSWSC 270 
[36] (Harrison J); New South Wales v Ibbett [2005] NSWCA 445, [90] (Spigelman CJ).  
180 Civil Liability Act 2002 (NSW) s 21; Personal Injuries (Liabilities and Damages) Act 2003 (NT) s 19; 
Civil Liability Act 2003 (Qld) s 52. 
181 Cassell & Co Ltd v Broome [1972] AC 1027, 1085 (Lord Reid).  
182 Lamb v Cotogno (1987) 164 CLR 1, 8 (The Court). 
183 New South Wales v Corby (2010) 76 NSWLR 439. 
184 New South Wales v Ibbett (2006) 229 CLR 638, 646–7 [29]–[32] (Gleeson CJ, Gummow, Kirby, Heydon 
and Crennan JJ). 
185 Gray v Motor Accident Commission (1998) 196 CLR 1, 7 [15] (Gleeson CJ, McHugh, Gummow and 
Hayne JJ); Whitfeld v De Lauret & Co Ltd (1920) 29 CLR 71, 81 (Isaacs J).  
186 Uren v John Fairfax & Sons Pty Ltd (1966) 117 CLR 118, 129 (Taylor J). 
187 Henry v Thompson [1989] 2 Qd R 412; Fontin v Katapodis (1962) 108 CLR 177. 
188 AW v New South Wales [2005] NSWSC 543. For commentary, see Cockburn and Madden, above n 153. 
189 New South Wales v Ibbett (2006) 229 CLR 638, 648 [35]–[36] (Gleeson CJ, Gummow, Kirby, Heydon 
and Crennan JJ).  
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The High Court has explicitly held that the purpose of exemplary damages is 
to punish and deter a defendant.190 Accordingly, an award of exemplary damages 
may not be made where a defendant has already been convicted and subjected to 
a ‘substantial’ punishment for a criminal offence arising from the same conduct 
for which exemplary damages are sought. That would be a double punishment.191 
The situation is uncertain, however, where there is only the possibility of later 
criminal prosecution which has not been commenced or where a prosecution is 
not concluded at the time of a civil trial. There is also the possibility that a civil 
court might consider whether a non-custodial sentence is ‘substantial’ so as to 
preclude the imposition of an exemplary damages award.192 Justice Kirby has 
held that an award of exemplary damages is discretionary so that a criminal 
conviction does not automatically bar an award. It must however be taken into 
account given that the object of exemplary damages is to punish a defendant.193 
Where an institutional defendant is vicariously liable for the deliberate 
tortious conduct of the perpetrator, exemplary and aggravated damages should, 
on current authority, be available against the institution in most states. 194 
However, such damages will not be available against institutional defendants in 
respect of negligence liability. Legislative reform allowing an award of 
aggravated and/or exemplary damages on common law principles against 
institutions in cases of negligently inflicted child sexual abuse would be 
necessary given the present restrictions under state legislation. 
Whether it would be appropriate to legislate retrospectively to enable the 
award of aggravated and exemplary damages on common law principles for past 
abuse claims in the tort of negligence is a difficult question. To do so would 
increase potential liability of institutions very significantly where the number of 
maintainable claims would increase in the event that suggested reforms regarding 
abolition of limitation periods and identification of defendants were 
implemented. The possibility of such damages awards in respect of future cases 
would be a powerful deterrent and incentive for institutions to ensure as far as 
possible that future child sexual abuse does not occur. 
 
E   Apologies 
There is increasing recognition of the value of an apology in civil 
proceedings especially where the plaintiff has suffered an abuse of human 
                                                 
190 XL Petroleum (NSW) Pty Ltd v Caltex Oil (Australia) Pty Ltd (1985) 155 CLR 448. 
191 Gray v Motor Accident Commission (1998) 196 CLR 1, 13–14 [38]–[43] (Gleeson CJ, McHugh, 
Gummow and Hayne JJ). 
192 Ibid 14–15 [45], [48] (Gleeson CJ, McHugh, Gummow and Hayne JJ). 
193 Ibid 31–4 [92]–[98] (Kirby J). 
194 Zorom Enterprises Pty Ltd v Zabow (2007) 71 NSWLR 354, 358–9 [13]–[14] (Basten JA) (McColl and 
Campbell JJA agreeing), where the NSW Court of Appeal held that Civil Liability Act 2002 (NSW) s 
3B(1) ‘does not differentiate in its operation between direct and vicarious liability’ and applies to exclude 
the operation of the Civil Liability Act 2002 (NSW) provisions restricting damages to vicarious liability 
for deliberate harm. 
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rights.195 At common law the courts do not have power to order apologies, but an 
apology can be given on settlement of a claim. The present common law position 
is that admissions of regret or apologies will not automatically constitute 
admissions of liability. 196  Parliaments clearly acknowledge the merit of an 
apology as one in a suite of remedies in a range of civil proceedings.197 In most 
Australian jurisdictions an apology in a claim in the tort of negligence is not 
admissible as an admission of liability.198 
The Royal Commission has not recommended court-ordered apologies  
but has recommended that institutions should provide direct personal responses 
to survivors, including an apology, on request by a survivor. 199  A statutory 
requirement for apologies in cases of institutional child sexual abuse might be 
considered. While a court-ordered apology might not have the same value as a 
genuine apology freely given, a court- or statute-mandated apology would serve a 
worthwhile purpose in providing to a survivor a statement of acknowledgement 
and regret for abusive treatment. 
 
IV   IDENTIFYING A PROPER DEFENDANT WITH ASSETS TO 
MEET A CLAIM 
A   Faith-Based Institutions with Statutory Property Trusts 
The Royal Commission’s Report details the disproportionate numbers of 
abuse cases in faith-based institutions.200 One of the major impediments to claims 
by these plaintiffs201 is identifying any corporate entity in existence at the time the 
abuse occurred and still existing that has assets available to meet a judgment. In 
                                                 
195 Prue Vines, ‘The Power of Apology: Mercy, Forgiveness or Corrective Justice in the Civil Liability 
Arena?’ (2007) 1 Public Space: The Journal of Law and Social Justice 1; Prue Vines, ‘The Apology in 
Civil Liability: Underused and Undervalued?’ (2013) 115 Precedent 28; Prue Vines, ‘Apologies and 
Civil Liability in the UK: A View from Elsewhere’ (2008) 12 Edinburgh Law Review 200; Robyn 
Carroll, ‘You Can’t Order Sorriness, So Is There Any Value in an Ordered Apology? An Analysis of 
Ordered Apologies in Anti-discrimination Cases’ (2010) 33 University of New South Wales Law Journal 
360; Robyn Carroll, ‘Apologies as a Legal Remedy’ (2013) 35 Sydney Law Review 317; Craig Brown, 
‘Apology Legislation: Oiling the Wheels of Tort’ (2009) 17 Tort Law Review 127; Chris Wheeler, ‘The 
Power of Sorry’ (Paper presented at Judicial Commission of NSW Ngara Yara Program Twilight 
Seminar, 16 February 2011). 
196 Dovuro Pty Ltd v Wilkins (2003) 215 CLR 317. 
197 See, eg, apology orders available pursuant to: Federal Court Act 1976 (Cth) s 23 (in federal anti-
discrimination cases); Anti-Discrimination Act 1997 (NSW) s 108(2)(d); Privacy and Personal 
Information Protection Act 1998 (NSW) s 55(2)(e); Anti-Discrimination Act 1991 (Qld) s 209(1). 
198 Civil Law (Wrongs) Act 2002 (ACT) s 14; Civil Liability Act 2002 (NSW) s 69; Personal Injuries 
(Liabilities and Damages) Act 2003 (NT) s 13; Civil Liability Act 2003 (Qld) s 72; Civil Liability Act 
1936 (SA) s 75; Civil Liability Act 2002 (Tas) s 7; Wrongs Act 1958 (Vic) s 14J; Civil Liability Act 2002 
(WA) s 5AH.  
199 Redress and Civil Litigation Report, above n 1, 172, rec 5(c)(i). Where a survivor wants no direct contact 
with the institution, the Commission recommends that the operator of the recommended redress scheme 
should facilitate the provision of an apology by the institution: at 176, rec 6. 
200 Ibid 121, table 11. 
201 Particularly in relation to claims against the Catholic Church. 
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many instances survivors were abused in institutions that were unincorporated 
associations though they were part of a mainstream church and conducted by 
clergy or other religious personnel or lay members of the church. While there 
existed a hierarchical church authority and while institutions were situated on 
church real estate, there was no corporate structure and no legal relationship of 
responsibility between church corporations or trusts and the institution or church 
members responsible for the abuse.202 
It seems manifestly unjust that survivors of abuse in faith-based institutions 
have no opportunity to recover compensation at common law from long-
established religious groups having very significant assets. Those assets are 
unavailable to meet a judgment and the religious group cannot be made a party to 
litigation because of its lack of corporate personality. Yet these same churches 
have the benefit of perpetual succession in relation to property ownership under 
state and territory legislation.203 
The decision of the New South Wales Court of Appeal in Trustees of the 
Roman Catholic Church v Ellis (‘Ellis’) 204  illustrates the difficulties facing 
survivors of child sexual abuse by persons associated with unincorporated 
religious bodies. In that case the plaintiff joined as a defendant the Trustees of 
the Roman Catholic Church for the Archdiocese of Sydney, a statutory body 
corporate with perpetual succession established under the Roman Catholic 
Church Trust Property Act 1936 (NSW).205 The plaintiff’s case was that the Trust 
owned the church property for the Archdiocese of Sydney including the church 
premises at Bass Hill where the plaintiff was sexually abused by the parish priest 
and that ‘as the permanent corporate entity or interface between the spiritual and 
temporal sides of the Church [it was] legally responsible for the Acts and 
                                                 
202 Commonwealth, Royal Commission into Institutional Responses to Child Sexual Abuse, Consultation 
Paper: Redress and Civil Litigation (2015) 220–5 [10.4] (‘Redress Consultation Paper’). The 
Commission stated that it had not been given examples of difficulties in suing because of a lack of an 
appropriate corporate defendant in situations involving unincorporated associations other than faith-based 
organisations: at 223 [10.4]. See also Patrick Parkinson, ‘Child Sexual Abuse and the Churches: A Story 
of Moral Failure?’ (2014) 26 Current Issues in Criminal Justice 119, 132. 
203 See, eg, Anglican Church of Australia Trust Property Act 1917 (NSW); Christian Israelite Church 
Property Trust Act 2007 (NSW); Roman Catholic Church Trust Property Act 1936 (NSW); Anglican 
Trusts Corporation Act 1884 (Vic); Coptic Orthodox Church (Victoria) Property Trust Act 2006 (Vic); 
Presbyterian Trusts Act 1890 (Vic); Roman Catholic Trusts Act 1907 (Vic); The Salvation Army 
(Victoria) Property Trust Act 1930 (Vic).  
204 (2007) 70 NSWLR 565. This decision was followed in PAO v Trustees of the Roman Catholic Church for 
the Archdiocese of Sydney [2011] NSWSC 1216. Separate plaintiffs who were students at Patrician 
Brothers Primary School at Granville had their cases heard with four other identical claims. All were 
unsuccessful for the same reasons. 
205 He also sued the Archbishop of Sydney and the alleged abuser who died in 2004 (after proceedings were 
commenced). It was held by the Court of Appeal that an action could not be maintained against the 
Archbishop in his personal capacity as he was not serving at the time of the abuse, he was not a 
representative of the Archdiocese and nor was he a corporate entity: Ellis (2007) 70 NSWLR 565, 583 
[78] (Mason P) (Ipp and McColl JJA agreeing). The proceedings were not continued against the estate of 
the deceased alleged abuser. 
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omissions of the Archbishop and his subordinates’.206 The evidence was that the 
Trustees had no role in the appointment or oversight of priests.207 The plaintiff’s 
claim against the Trustees failed in the Court of Appeal where it was held that the 
statutory recognition of the Trust as capable of being sued in its corporate name 
did not render the Trust a defendant ‘responsive in law to any and every claim for 
legal redress that a person might wish to bring against a Catholic in the 
Archdiocese’.208 Furthermore, it was held that the fact that the Trustees held 
property for and on behalf of ‘the Church’ did not render the property available 
to meet any liability ‘associated with Church activities’.209 
If survivors are to be afforded a remedy in tort it should be a straightforward 
matter for them to identify and sue a corporate entity that has the financial 
capacity to meet claims. A potential solution to this problem would be legislation 
making church property trusts the proper defendants to claims for child sexual 
abuse for which the church is alleged to be liable, and to make that proper 
defendant liable for the tortious conduct of the perpetrators of the abuse and also 
for the negligent failures of the faith-based institutions to protect children in their 
care. The assets of the church property trusts should be made available to meet 
liability of the church in respect of any claim for institutional child sexual abuse. 
The Royal Commission’s Consultation Paper suggested that legislation 
conferring the benefit of succession to property owned by religious bodies could 
be amended to provide that liability of the religious body for institutional child 
sexual abuse could be met from the assets of the trust. Further, the trust could be 
made the proper defendant to claims of child sexual abuse against the religious 
body.210 
A non-government Bill introduced in the New South Wales Parliament in 
2014 provides an example of the type of provision that would ensure that a 
plaintiff would have the opportunity to sue in respect of abuse suffered in a faith-
based institution where there is no corporate defendant having available assets to 
meet a judgment. The Roman Catholic Church Trust Property Amendment 
(Justice for Victims) Bill 2014 (NSW)211  dealt specifically with the Catholic 
Church. In summary, it provided that a plaintiff claiming damages for sexual 
abuse by a member of the Church’s clergy (or other person related to the Church) 
while the plaintiff was in the care of the Church could join as a defendant to 
                                                 
206 These words were used by the judge at first instance who held that there was an arguable case against the 
Trustees: Ellis v Pell [2006] NSWSC 109, [73] (Patten JA). 
207 Ellis (2007) 70 NSWLR 565, 590 [120] (Mason P) (Ipp and McColl JJA agreeing). 
208 Ibid 590 [118] (Mason P) (Ipp and McColl JJA agreeing). 
209 Ibid 596 [149] (Mason P) (Ipp and McColl JJA agreeing). The Court of Appeal referred to Archbishop of 
Perth v ‘AA’ to ‘JC’ (1995) 18 ACSR 333, where the plaintiffs sought to make a legal person liable for 
damages for sexual and physical abuse allegedly committed by members of the Christian Brothers. In that 
case the plaintiffs were unsuccessful for the same reasons as the plaintiff in Ellis. 
210 Redress Consultation Paper, above n 202, 224 [10.4].  
211 A private member’s public Bill introduced by David Shoebridge MLC. The Bill lapsed on prorogation on 
2 March 2015; it had lapsed previously on prorogation on 8 September 2014 and been restored to 
Business Papers on 9 September 2014. The Royal Commission referred to the Bill in its Report: Redress 
and Civil Litigation Report, above n 1, 501.  
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proceedings the body corporate established under the Roman Catholic Church 
Trust Property Act 1936 (NSW) and the trustees of Church trust property. 
Further, a body corporate established under the Roman Catholic Church 
Communities’ Lands Act 1942 (NSW) which employed the abuser or that  
was trustee of land of a community to which the abuser belonged could be joined 
as a defendant. These corporations and their trustees were to be jointly and 
severally liable as if they were the abuser. 212  The provisions were to apply 
retrospectively.213 The Bill further provided that judgment debts for sexual abuse 
by Church clergy, officials or teachers could be required to be paid from trust 
funds. 214  While the New South Wales Bill dealt solely with liability of the 
Catholic Church, a general provision of this type would be appropriate to all 
cases of faith-based institutions. 
The final recommendations of the Royal Commission on this issue do not go 
so far as to recommend that in all cases, property trusts are to be the ‘proper 
defendants’ to proceedings against faith-based organisations. Rather, the 
Commission has recommended a kind of default setting whereby if any 
institution with which a property trust is associated fails to nominate a proper 
defendant with sufficient assets to meet a claim when a survivor wishes to 
litigate, then the property trust is the proper defendant. In such circumstances the 
liability of the institution could be met from the assets of the trust.215 While the 
Commission’s recommended legislation would achieve the desired result, it relies 
on compliance by religious organisations. If they were reluctant or tardy to 
nominate a suitable entity as defendant, plaintiffs would be disadvantaged by 
delay and procedural difficulties. Legislation making church or religious property 
trusts the ‘proper defendant’ from the outset is the surest way to preclude the 
problems illustrated by Ellis. 
 
B   Difficulties in Identifying a Proper Defendant in Institutions  
Other than Faith-Based Institutions 
The Royal Commission’s recommendation concerning the nomination of 
proper defendants applies to institutions with which property trusts are 
associated. However, there would be many unincorporated institutions or 
associations having no association with property trusts. Under the legislation 
recommended by the Royal Commission, they would not be subject to any 
requirement to nominate proper defendants. There are many institutions or 
associations which are smaller and less hierarchically organised than their faith-
based counterparts, but which are no less responsible for the wellbeing of 
children in their care or control. In such cases, the lack of a corporate entity to 
                                                 
212 There was provision for extension of the provisions to a plaintiff who was not at the time of the abuse 
under the care of the Church, but was so closely connected with the Church that it would be just to make 
the Church liable for the abuse, if proven: The Roman Catholic Church Trust Property Amendment 
(Justice for Victims) Bill 2014 (NSW) cl 18(2). 
213 Ibid cl 18. 
214 Ibid cl 19. 
215 Redress and Civil Litigation Report, above n 1, 511, recs 94–5.  
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sue is, however, only the threshold problem. Many associations (particularly 
small interest groups or sporting or other clubs) may have no assets which would 
be available to meet a judgment, even if there were an entity to be sued. 
One approach would be to require that in future such entities carry insurance 
or self-insure with declared assets against claims for civil liability for child 
sexual abuse by employees or associates or volunteers. Such a proposal was 
considered by the Royal Commission in its Redress Consultation Paper216 and a 
similar solution has also been proposed by the Parliament of Victoria Family and 
Community Development Committee in its Betrayal of Trust Report.217 
The Royal Commission accepted that there may be ‘some merit’ in the 
Victorian Parliament Family and Community Development Committee’s 
recommendation that, where the Victorian Government funds non-government 
organisations or provides tax exemptions or other entitlements, the government 
consider requiring them to be incorporated and adequately insured. 218  The 
Commission was ultimately persuaded that compulsory incorporation and 
insurance of small community organisations would potentially deter people from 
forming small associations, thereby ‘losing the various sporting, cultural and 
other activities they provide in the community’.219  For this reason the Royal 
Commission declined to recommend that any organisations should be required  
to incorporate. 220  The Royal Commission did however suggest that where 
unincorporated bodies receive direct or indirect government funding to provide 
children’s services, they might be required to insure.221 
To ensure access to compensation by survivors, the preferable approach 
would be to require incorporation of bodies which undertake responsibility for 
the physical welfare or spiritual, psychological or emotional guidance of 
children. This is especially so in the case of organisations that are funded by 
government or provided with tax exemptions and other entitlements. Exemptions 
could be allowed for small organisations (sporting and other clubs with small 
memberships, for example). The requirement for compulsory incorporation and 
insurance could be limited to specific types of organisations which provide 
particular types of children’s services, as was suggested by the Royal 
Commission in its Redress Consultation Paper.222 
A statutory requirement for incorporation of at least some of these non-
government organisations would ensure that survivors have the capacity to easily 
identify and sue a corporate entity. The Royal Commission did not discuss the 
reasons why such a proposal could not be framed in a way that provided the 
benefits of incorporation and insurance, but it was apparently to avoid deterring 
desirable social activities among sporting and smaller associations. 
                                                 
216 Redress Consultation Paper, above n 202, 224 [10.4].  
217 Betrayal of Trust Report, above n 119, 536. 
218 Redress and Civil Litigation Report, above n 1, 510. 
219 Ibid 511. See also Redress Consultation Paper, above n 202, 224 [10.4].  
220 Redress and Civil Litigation Report, above n 1, 511. 
221 Ibid. 
222 Ibid. 
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V   STATUTORY LIMITATION PERIODS 
The threshold issue for most survivors wishing to pursue a claim at common 
law is the expiration of a limitation period, which is a major obstacle. It is well 
documented that many survivors take many years to disclose their abuse.223 The 
Royal Commission found that the average time taken by those who attended its 
sessions to disclose their sexual abuse was 22 years from the date of the abuse.224 
 
A   Limitation Periods for Personal Injury 
All Australian states and territories impose limitation periods for claims in 
respect of personal injury.225 Following the recommendations of the Ipp Report226 
in 2002, some Australian jurisdictions 227  enacted limitation provisions that 
generally follow the recommendations, though they are not uniform.228 Broadly 
speaking, pursuant to these provisions the limitation period of three years 
commences upon the date of ‘discoverability’ of the cause of action with a ‘long-
stop’ period of 12 years running from the date of the event on which the claim is 
based. In some instances the courts have discretion to extend the long-stop period 
to the expiry of a period of three years from the date of discoverability. 
Limitation periods may be suspended during any incapacity of the plaintiff, 
                                                 
223 These reasons include: infancy; debilitating psychological injury as a result of the abuse; lack of access to 
legal advice; ignorance of the link between the abuse and psychiatric illness; fear of retaliation; personal 
guilt; fear of not being believed; the possibility of retraumatisation associated with seeking civil remedy 
or complaint to criminal law enforcement authorities: see Commonwealth, Royal Commission into 
Institutional Responses to Child Sexual Abuse, Interim Report (2014) 8 [5.1]; Patrick Parkinson, Kim 
Oates and Amanda Jayakody, ‘Breaking the Long Silence: Reports of Child Sexual Abuse in the 
Anglican Church of Australia’ (2010) 6 Ecclesiology 183, cited in Judy Cashmore and Rita Shackel, 
Responding to Child Sexual Abuse (May 2013) Australian Review of Public Affairs 
<http://www.australianreview.net/digest/2013/05/cashmore_shackel.html>. 
224 Redress Consultation Paper, above n 202, 204 [10.2]. See also figures for Queensland cases: Ben 
Mathews, ‘Limitation Periods and Child Sexual Abuse Cases: Law, Psychology, Time and Justice’ 
(2003) 11 Torts Law Journal 218; and SA: Jan Breckenridge, Joan Cunningham and Karen Jennings, Cry 
for Help: Client and Worker Experiences of Disclosure and Help Seeking Regarding Child Sexual Abuse 
(2008) Relationships Australia <http://www.respondsa.org.au/wp-content/uploads/sites/8/2013/05/Cry-
for-Help-Report_2008.pdf>. 
225 Limitation Act 1985 (ACT) s 16B (three years); Limitation Act 1969 (NSW) s 50(C) (three years with 12 
year long-stop); Limitation Act 1981 (NT) s 12(1) (three years); Limitation of Actions Act 1974 (Qld) 
s 11(1) (three years); Limitation of Actions Act 1936 (SA) s 36(1) (three years); Limitation Act 1974 (Tas) 
s 5A (three years with 12 year long-stop); Limitation of Actions Act 1958 (Vic) s 27D (three years with 12 
year long-stop); Limitation Act 2005 (WA) s 14(1) (three years). 
226 Ipp Report, above n 104, 87–97, recs 23–5. 
227 Limitation Act 1969 (NSW); Limitation Act 1974 (Tas); Limitation of Actions Act 1958 (Vic).  
228 For discussion, see Peter Handford, ‘“Negligence, Nuisance or Breach of Duty” and “Disease or 
Disorder”: Personal Injury Limitation Periods in the High Court’ (2006) 14 Tort Law Review 125; Ben 
Mathews, ‘Post-Ipp Special Limitation Periods for Cases of Injury to a Child by a Parent or Close 
Associate: New Jurisdictional Gulfs’ (2004) 12 Torts Law Journal 239; Mathews, ‘Limitation Periods 
and Child Sexual Abuse Cases’, above n 224. 
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including minority or disability.229 Though, it should be noted that in New South 
Wales and Victoria the provisions concerning children are particularly severe 
with the limitation period continuing to run during minority in most cases where 
a child has a parent or guardian, except where minors were injured by the parent, 
guardian or close associate of the parent or guardian.230 Under present limitation 
legislation around Australia, plaintiffs whose claims are statute barred need to 
persuade a court that it is just and reasonable to grant an extension of time in 
which to bring proceedings.231 
There are important rationales for the imposition of limitation periods: that 
delays in commencing proceedings lead to loss of evidence; that it may be 
oppressive to defendants to allow distant past claims to be maintained; that 
defendants should be able to arrange their affairs without indefinite uncertainty 
concerning potential liability; and that public interest requires that disputes 
should be settled expeditiously.232 Yet the law must maintain a balance between 
the rights of defendants and those of plaintiffs233 so that the limitation period does 
not operate to shut out claims unjustly. 
 
B   Effect of Limitation Periods in Institutional Child Sexual Abuse 
Numerous cases illustrate the potency of the limitation defence and the 




                                                 
229 Limitation Act 1985 (ACT) s 36; Limitation Act 1981 (NT) s 36(1); Limitation of Actions Act 1974 (Qld) 
s 29; Limitation of Actions Act 1936 (SA) ss 45, 45A; Limitation Act 1974 (Tas) s 26; Limitation Act 2005 
(WA) ss 30–3. 
230 Limitation Act 1969 (NSW) ss 50E, 50F; Limitation of Actions Act 1958 (Vic) ss 27I, 27J. See Mathews, 
‘Post-Ipp Special Limitation Periods’, above n 228; Ben Mathews, ‘Assessing the Scope of the Post-Ipp 
“Close Associate” Special Limitation Period for Child Abuse Cases’ (2004) 11 James Cook University 
Law Review 63. 
231 Generally, the matters which the courts are required to consider on an application for extension are: the 
length of and reasons for the delay; any prejudice to the defendant by reason of lost evidence; the nature 
and extent of the plaintiff’s injury; any conduct of the defendant that induced the delay by the plaintiff; 
the plaintiff’s efforts to obtain medical, legal or other expert advice and the nature of advice received; the 
time when the cause of action was discoverable. See, eg, Limitation Act 1969 (NSW) ss 62A, 62B. In 
NSW there is the added requirement that a plaintiff must satisfy the Brisbane South onus by establishing 
that a fair trial is possible notwithstanding a prolonged delay and despite a presumed reduced capacity for 
witnesses to recall events: Brisbane South Regional Health Authority v Taylor (1996) 186 CLR 541 
(‘Brisbane South’). 
232 Brisbane South (1996) 186 CLR 541, 552 (McHugh J); Batistatos v Roads and Traffic Authority of New 
South Wales (2006) 226 CLR 256, 320 [218] (Callinan J); David Jackson, ‘The Legal Effects of the 
Passing of Time’ (1970) 7 Melbourne University Law Review 407, 409. 
233 Brisbane South (1996) 186 CLR 541, 553 (McHugh J). 
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sexual abuse.234  In Ellis v Pell 235  the plaintiff was successful in obtaining an 
extension of time in which to sue the second defendant.236 Mr Ellis was required 
to provide much detailed evidence of his psychiatric injury and he was cross-
examined for more than three days during the hearing.237 The cases illustrate how 
arguments about limitation periods can be hard-fought by defendants and 
distressing for claimants. It is also clear that the institutional childhood sexual 
abuse cases offer little guidance as to the likely outcome. 
The impact of statutory limitation periods on child sexual abuse cases is 
disproportionate to other civil claims because of the particular circumstances of 
adult survivors of child sexual abuse who so often are unable to disclose their 
abuse or to seek compensation for many years afterwards. Further, the 
psychiatric injuries caused by the abuse are the very reason that the survivors 
have been unable to commence proceedings earlier: effectively the defendants 
are a significant cause of the delay. In very many cases of institutional  
child sexual abuse, adult plaintiffs will need to make successful applications  
for extension of limitation periods before any issue in the substantive causes can 
be tried. 238  The process is expensive, uncertain, carries a high risk of an 
unfavourable costs order and takes a further emotional and psychological toll 
upon a likely already fragile plaintiff survivor. 
A common argument against removing limitation periods entirely is the risk 
that delay will prejudice the ability of a defendant to defend proceedings where 
critical evidence has been lost or key witnesses are no longer available. Yet, the 
removal of the limitation period would not abrogate the statutory power of courts 
to stay, by order, any proceedings before the court, either permanently or until a 
                                                 
234 See, eg, Cranbrook School v Stanley [2002] NSWCA 290; Hopkins v Queensland [2004] QDC 21; SDW 
v Church of Jesus Christ of Latter-Day Saints [2008] NSWSC 1249 (applying Limitation of Actions Act 
1974 (Qld)), where an extension of time was refused. In Salvation Army (South Australia Property Trust) 
v Rundle [2008] NSWCA 347, [107] (McColl JA), [134]–[143] (Basten JA), [155]–[156] (Bell JA), an 
extension of time under the Limitation of Actions Act 1936 (SA) was upheld in the NSW Court of Appeal. 
In Lloyd v Bambach [2005] NSWSC 80, an extension of time was granted. 
235 [2006] NSWSC 109. The third defendant (the plaintiff’s abuser) had died prior to the hearing and the 
plaintiff did not proceed against his estate. The Court held that the cause of action could not be 
maintained against Archbishop Pell and dismissed the motion in respect of the first defendant with costs. 
236 Ibid [95] (Patten AJ). The Court held that he had not become aware of the nature and extent of his injury 
until September 2001, though the abuse he suffered had ceased in 1979. The court exercised its discretion 
to grant an extension of time having concluded that it would be just and reasonable to do so because the 
evidence sufficiently established that there could be ‘a fair trial of the Plaintiff’s action albeit not a perfect 
one’. 
237 Australian Lawyers Alliance, Submission to Royal Commission into Institutional Responses to Child 
Sexual Abuse, Consultation Paper on Redress and Civil Litigation, 2 March 2015, 16 [46]. For a 
perspective from Mr Ellis himself, see John Ellis and Nicola Ellis, ‘A New Model for Seeking 
Meaningful Redress for Victims of Church-Related Sexual Assault’ (2014) 26 Current Issues in Criminal 
Justice 31. 
238 In NSW the issue of limitation periods can be determined together with other substantive issues at the 
hearing, or separately at an interlocutory hearing: Guthrie v Spence (2009) 78 NSWLR 225, 229 [10] 
(Campbell JA). High Court authority is to the effect that generally, all issues should be determined in one 
hearing: Wardley Australia Ltd v Western Australia (1992) 175 CLR 514, 533 (Mason CJ, Dawson, 
Gaudron and McHugh JJ). 
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specified day.239 Supreme courts have inherent power to stay proceedings which 
are an abuse of process240 permanently where there cannot be a fair trial due to 
delay in commencing the proceedings. 241  This inherent power of the courts 
mitigates any concern about disadvantage to institutional defendants.242 
 
C   Legislative Reforms to Date 
In some Australian legislatures there is now recognition that the demands of 
justice for survivors of child sexual abuse require alteration to existing statutory 
limitation regimes. In New South Wales the Limitation Amendment (Child 
Abuse) Act 2016 (NSW) removes altogether the limitation period for damages 
claims for death or personal injury arising from child abuse. The Act defines 
‘child abuse’ as abuse perpetrated against a person under 18 years of age, that is 
sexual abuse, serious physical abuse, and/or other abuse perpetrated in 
connection with sexual or serious physical abuse. 243  Importantly, the Act 
preserves any inherent jurisdiction of the courts including the court’s powers to 
stay proceedings where a defendant would be unduly prejudiced by delay. In 
Victoria, the Limitation of Actions Amendment (Child Abuse) Act 2015 (Vic) 
retrospectively removes limitation periods for causes of action for damage 
resulting from physical or sexual abuse (and consequent psychological damage) 
when the plaintiff was a minor.244 
 
D   The Royal Commission’s Recommendation 
The Royal Commission has recommended that state and territory 
governments should retrospectively remove limitation periods in respect of all 
claims for personal injury resulting from institutional childhood sexual abuse.245 
                                                 
239 See, eg, Civil Procedure Act 2005 (NSW) s 67. 
240 Jago v District Court of New South Wales (1989) 168 CLR 23. 
241 Batistatos v Roads and Traffic Authority of New South Wales (2006) 226 CLR 256.  
242 Indeed, the NSW Department of Justice made this very point in its Discussion Paper: ‘Given that long 
delays are typical in these cases, it may be preferable that a court’s decision to hear or not hear a claim is 
based on [the court’s power to stay proceedings], rather than on a technical issue regarding whether the 
statutory period has expired and whether any exceptions may apply’: NSW Government, Department of 
Justice, ‘Limitation Periods in Civil Claims for Child Sexual Abuse’ (Discussion Paper, January 2015) 
11. 
243 Limitation Amendment (Child Abuse) Act 2016 (NSW) sch 1. 
244 Limitation of Actions Act 1958 (Vic) ss 27O–27P. The Limitation of Actions Amendment (Child Abuse) 
Act 2015 (Vic) was enacted in response to the Betrayal of Trust Report, above n 119. Similarly, in 
Canada most provinces and territories have legislated to alter limitation periods for cases of child sexual 
abuse and in many instances the limitation period has been removed altogether, though the legislation is 
not uniform. Alberta: Limitations Act, RSA 2000, c L-12; British Columbia: Limitation Act, SBC 2012, c 
13; Manitoba: Limitation of Actions Act, CCSM 2014, c L-150; New Brunswick: Limitation of Actions 
Act, SNB 2009, c L-8.5; Newfoundland and Labrador: Limitations Act, SNL 1995, c L-16.1; 
Saskatchewan: The Limitations Act, SS 2004, c L-16.1; Yukon: Limitation of Actions Act, RSY 2002, c 
139. For a discussion of the problems of non-uniformity of Canadian legislation and remaining 
unresolved issues, see Elizabeth Adjin-Tettey and Freya Kodar, ‘Improving the Potential of Tort Law for 
Redressing Historical Abuse Claims: The Need for a Contextualised Approach to the Limitation Defence’ 
(2010) 42 Ottawa Law Review 95. 
245 Redress and Civil Litigation Report, above n 1, 459, recs 85–8.  
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This recommendation is consistent with the approach in other Australian and 
overseas common law jurisdictions.246 There is no limitation period in relation to 
criminal prosecution for the abuse which causes the injuries for which adult 
survivors seek compensation. It has been argued that this anomaly should be a 
persuasive factor enabling survivors to bring civil claims out of time.247 
The removal of limitation periods altogether 248  is a straightforward and 
effective method of providing plaintiffs with a pathway to a tortious remedy. It 
obviates the need for expensive and uncertain interlocutory proceedings where 
defendants plead the limitation defence and seek to have proceedings struck out. 
Plaintiffs would not be required to provide evidence of their psychological 
damage at the interlocutory stage, and defendants’ legal attention would shift to 
the merits of the substantive case rather than a limitation defence. Existing 
judicial powers to order the stay of proceedings, or to strike out or dismiss claims 
without prospects of success, provide protection to defendants against prejudicial 
litigation in respect of distant past events. 
 
VI   COMMON LAW RIGHTS UNDER A REDRESS SCHEME 
Finally, we consider whether, if a redress scheme is implemented, survivors 
of past abuse should retain their common law rights if they receive payment 
under the scheme. The Royal Commission has recommended that a single 
national redress scheme be established by the Australian government with the 
cooperation of states and territories.249 The Royal Commission recommends that 
an applicant receiving a payment pursuant to the scheme be required to release 
the scheme and the contributing government and the relevant institution from any 
further liability for the abuse.250 The applicant would be required to sign a deed of 
release and would be provided with limited fixed-price legal advice funded by 
the scheme before accepting the scheme offer and signing the release. 251  Of 
course, it is a basic tenet of the common law that a person should not be 
compensated twice for a single loss and clearly double recovery should be 
prohibited. But it is not necessary to require survivors effectively to make an 
election between a claim against a redress scheme and a common law claim to 
avoid double compensation. A fairer arrangement would be to require a survivor 
who had obtained a payment under a redress scheme to refund the payment upon 
                                                 
246 Ibid 383–90, recs 63–5.  
247 Applications 861 and 864 (Unreported, District Court of Queensland, Botting DCJ, 21 June 2002), where 
the defendant had been convicted of sexual offences against the plaintiffs, yet the Court held that a 38-
year delay in bringing proceedings was too prejudicial to the defendant.  
248 Redress and Civil Litigation Report, above n 1, 459, recs 85–8. 
249 Ibid 322–4, recs 26–30, 355, recs 43–7. 
250 Ibid 383–90, recs 63–5. 
251 Ibid 389–90, recs 64–5. 
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subsequent recovery of common law damages in respect of the same abuse for 
which the scheme payment was received.252 
The Royal Commission was persuaded that survivors should be required to 
give up their common law rights because the scheme was seen as an alternative 
to litigation rather than an addition to it. Given that the Commission has stated 
that the payments pursuant to the proposed redress scheme ‘should not attempt to 
be fully compensatory or to replicate common law damages’, 253  there is an 
apparent contradiction where receipt of a payment under the scheme would 
extinguish a claimant’s common law right to sue for damages, especially as the 
scheme would not offer sums comparable in value to common law damages.254 
The Royal Commission was further influenced by the practical consideration 
of increasing the likelihood that institutions and insurers would respond 
favourably to the proposal for a scheme if payments extinguished common law 
rights.255 Such an approach may be pragmatic but it does not necessarily best 
serve the interests of fairness for survivors of abuse. 
The Commission emphasised the likely increased costs to the scheme if 
common law rights were preserved because the Actuaries Institute had 
submitted that the costs of ‘no-fault schemes’ increased where common law 
entitlement coexisted.256 In the context of recommending a universal scheme for 
disability care and support, the Australian Productivity Commission emphatically 
stated that avoidance of double compensation involves ‘significant, unavoidable 
administrative complexities and high costs’257 where an injured person receives 
financial compensation for injury as well as having access to taxpayer-funded 
social welfare services. But the redress scheme proposed for survivors of 
institutional child sexual abuse is not a universal ‘no-fault liability scheme’ in the 
same category as the National Disability Insurance Scheme or workers 
compensation schemes or motor accident compensation schemes. It is an entirely 
different species of smaller scheme that is not to be entirely funded by 
government. It will provide single payments of limited financial redress to a 
finite number of victims of past wrongdoing, as well as some counselling and 
psychological services. It is envisaged that the scheme will eventually close,258 
with the number of potential claimants estimated at 60 000.259 In this context the 
arguments concerning efficiency, complexity of administration and the high 
expense of avoiding double compensation are not so persuasive because the scale 
                                                 
252 There are precedents for this type of arrangement in past and present workers’ compensation statutes in 
various Australian jurisdictions: see, eg, Workers Compensation Act 1951 (ACT) ss 184–6. 
253 Redress and Civil Litigation Report, above n 1, 222.  
254 The Australian Lawyers Alliance argued strongly in the Royal Commission that survivors should not be 
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is much reduced. Any administrative and cost burden of avoidance of double 
compensation could be borne by the scheme rather than eliminated altogether by 
requiring survivors of abuse to forego their common law rights. In the event of a 
common law judgment or settlement, double compensation would be avoided by 
a refund or set-off arrangement in respect of any prior redress scheme payment 
and the plaintiff/applicant would cease to be eligible for counselling and 
psychological services through the redress scheme. 
 
VII   CONCLUSION 
Survivors of institutional child sexual abuse have long been faced with 
procedural and doctrinal hurdles making proceedings for compensation arising 
from extremely difficult circumstances only harder and more uncertain. There is 
now the opportunity for governments to implement reforms to clarify and reform 
the law. It will be up to the governments of Australia to agree on the form of 
institutional liability and additional measures to ensure better institutional 
practices and greater accountability for the future. To deliver effective and 
meaningful reform the preferable course is for the implementation of a package 
of specific, uniform legislative reforms. Reforms which provide for the 
retrospective removal of limitation periods, a clear basis for institutional liability, 
dual vicarious liability, consequential amendments to civil liability provisions, 
and the introduction of reforms to address the identification of proper defendants 
in faith-based institutions and other unincorporated associations, would 
ameliorate the most significant hurdles that currently stand in the way of 
compensation from institutions for child sexual abuse. 
The Royal Commission’s recommendations for statutory liability aim to 
clarify the cause of action on which survivors can claim compensation from 
institutions. This is much-needed reform given the current state of the common 
law of tort. The proposed extension of liability to a greater range of workers 
associated with institutions would be a significant and advantageous 
development for Australian law. However, there are unanswered questions about 
the form and scope of the proposed statutory liabilities. That said, these are 
matters which can be resolved in drafting the reforms: the more pressing concern 
will be the collective political will to ensure that statutory reforms to institutional 
liability will be passed. However, unless some substantive reforms are given 
retrospective operation, the reforms will assist future victims only. There is a 
strong argument to be made that Australian survivors of past abuse should not be 
worse off than survivors in other common law jurisdictions. 
 
